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I. INTRODUCTION
The policy area of public health has experienced a revolution in the past
decade. The revolution has not occurred in the technical arts of public health, such
as epidemiology. The revolution has been political in nature. The last decade has
witnessed the previously obscure and neglected policy area of public health shed
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obscurity and neglect to become the subject matter of intense national and
homeland security,' foreign policy, 2 and global governance 3 debates. The national
and international political attention public health has received in the last ten years
is unprecedented. Nothing in the prior history of national and international efforts
on public health compares to the political status public health has reached today.
For those who have dedicated their professional lives to protecting the health
of populations, this political revolution is a mixed blessing. The new political
attention focused on public health has translated into the commitment of political
capital and economic resources to public health on a scale previously unthinkable.4
As Ilona Kickbusch argued,
The protection of health is no longer seen as primarily a humanitarian and
technical issue relegated to a specialized UN agency, but more fully
considered in relation to the economic, political and security consequences
for the complex post-Cold War system of interdependence. This has led to
new policy and funding initiatives at many levels of governance and a new
political space within which global health action is conducted.5

* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of LawBloomington. The author thanks Dean Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs for
inviting him to present an earlier version of this article at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law in September 2003.
1. The threat of biological weapons and bioterrorism has, for example, raised the profile of public health
in the national and homeland security areas. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL SECURrfY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 13-17 (Sept. 2002) (analyzing the weapons of mass destruction threat, including biological
weapons, from rogue states and terrorists); OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY 43-44 (July 2002) (stressing the importance of improving health capabilities to respond
to biological terrorism); JENNIFER BROWER & PETER CHALK, THE GLOBAL THREAT OF NEW AND REEMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES: RECONCILING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PuBLIc HEALTH POLICY (2003);
BIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH: IN SEARCH OF A GLOBAL TREATMENT (Kurt M. Campbell &
Philip Zelikow eds., 2003).
2. See, e.g., JONATHAN BAN, HEALTH, SECURITY, AND U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP (Health and Security
Series Special Report No. 2) (2001); Jordan S. Kassalow, Why Health Is Importantto U.S. Foreign Policy (May
2001), available at http://www.milbank.org/reports/Foreignpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. See, e.g., KELLEY LEE ET AL., HEALTH IMPACrS OF GLOBALIZATION: TOWARDS GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Kelley Lee ed., 2003); Richard Dodgson et al., Global Health Governance: A Conceptual
Review (Key Issues in Global Health Governance Discussion Paper No. 1, Feb. 2002).
4. President George W. Bush has, for example, proposed spending $5.9 billion in fiscal 2003 to
strengthen national defenses against bioterrorism, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 1, at 68, and
$15 billion over five years to provide HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment assistance to countries in Africa and
the Caribbean badly affected by HIV/AIDS. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003)
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. Ilona Kickbusch, Global Health Governance: Some Theoretical Considerationson the New Political
Space, in HEALTH IMPACIS OF GLOBALIZATION: TOWARD GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 192-93.
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On the more somber side, the level of political attention now devoted to public
health is evidence of mounting threats to population health that are challenging and
6
sometimes overwhelming traditional attitudes, approaches, and capabilities. The
growing seriousness of these threats has ripped public health from its traditional
moorings and set it afloat on an increasingly tempestuous sea. Public health's
political revolution is, as yet, incomplete because fundamental questions about the
sea change public health is undergoing have not been answered. How should
public health be navigated during its difficult voyage? To what port or destination
should public health be steered and why?
My reading of the on-going debates involving the new political climate
affecting public health involves a sense that the incomplete revolution has left
public health caught in a conceptual dilemma, the full extent of which has not yet
been appreciated. The new political attention directed at public health means that
events have shifted this area of policy and law from traditional patterns toward
radically different conceptions of the problems and how to address them.7 This
article argues that, in many ways, public health is caught between these old and
new worlds-unable to retreat into the past but uncertain whether and how to
embrace a very different future.
In this article, I analyze this conundrum facing public health by drawing on
more general debates about the nature of international relations in the post-Cold
War period. Specifically, I see parallels between the discourse on public health's
new political reality and Robert Kagan's now famous analysis of the increasing
divergence of U.S. and European world views.8 According to Kagan:
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a
common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world....
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is
moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and
transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical
paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel
Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in
history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where
6. MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH: EMERGENCE, DETECTION, AND RESPONSE xvii (M. S. Smolinski et
al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH] (arguing that infectious diseases continue to be a
significant burden around the world and that public health and health care communities are not adequately
prepared for the infectious disease challenge).
7. I have, for example, argued that the successful handling of the 2003 global outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) represents a transition from traditional governance approaches to pathogenic
threats to a new, post-Westphalian governance context. See David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathology of the
First Post-Westphalian Pathogen, 31 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 485 (2003); DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS,
GOVERNANCE, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (forthcoming 2004).
8. See Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REV. (June 2002), available at
http://www.policyreview.org/jun02/kagan.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE INTHE NEW WORLD ORDER
(2003). Of Paradiseand Power is an extended version of the article "Power and Weakness."
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international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and
use of military might. 9
My use of Kagan's analysis to frame examination of public health's new
political reality is not designed to explore whether, to paraphrase Kagan,
"Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus"' on public health
questions today. This article is not a comparative study of U.S. and European
approaches to contemporary global public health problems." Kagan's analysis is
useful for my purposes, however, because it focuses on the existence of two
diverging world views and the future policy implications of this divergence.
I see, and analyze in this article, a similar divergence in "world views" on how
to handle the increasingly troublesome public health threats posed by pathogenic
microbes (Parts H-IV). I explore why these diverging views on pathogenic threats
exist and examine whether melding these views together might be possible (Part
V). At present, arguments for melding together the two different world views on
public health are frequent. 2 1 argue, however, that these various melding strategies
are unlikely to be successful for a reason that resonates with Kagan's exploration
of diverging U.S. and European world views-the "paradise" view is ultimately
dependent on the "power" view.3 Using the concept of the "axis of illness,"'' 4 I
explore public health's contemporary dependency on power in general and the
power of the United States in particular. The nature of the axis of illness means that
policy responses to pathogenic threats are likely to remain caught between paradise
and power, creating a political context for public health unlike anything else ever
seen in the history of this policy area.

II. CONCEPTUALIZING PUBLIC HEALTH AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS
A.

Defining Public Health

In the Introduction, I referred to "public health" as if this term has a widely
understood meaning. Unfortunately, it does not. Some preliminary attention to the
concept of public health is thus in order; but I also enter into the definitional
controversies of public health because they provide a window on the two main
ways pathogenic threats to human health have historically been conceptualized.

9.
10.

KAGAN, supra note 8, at 3.
Id.
11. U.S. and European approaches to public health as a foreign policy and national security issue was
explored at a conference entitled "Health as Foreign Policy: A U.S.-German Dialogue on Governance and
Global Health," Nov. 20-21, 2003, Berlin, Germany.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 72 ("Europe's evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle of
the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it.").
14. See infra Part V.B.
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The history of international diplomacy on public health reveals shifts taking place
between these two paradigms, including the policy shift that has taken place in the
past decade.
In 1988, the Institute of Medicine defined public health as "what we, as a
society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy."' 5
Despite being "[o]ne of the most commonly cited definitions of public health,"'' 6 it
has come under significant criticism in recent years. Laurie Garrett complained that
the Institute of Medicine's definition revealed little more than that "there was no
agreement about what constituted 'public health' other than assuring that people
were healthy."' 7 Mark Rothstein similarly criticized this definition as "a vague
definition that fails to indicate the primary objective or scope of public health."' 8
Rothstein's criticism forms part of his overall critique of "a growing trend to
include within the sphere of public health all the societal factors that affect
health,"' 9 or what Ilan Meyer and Sharon Schwartz called the "public
healthification" of social problems.' An example of this dynamic can be found in
the argument that "[s]ocial justice is the main pillar of public health."'" These
definitional controversies reveal, according to Garrett, that "the new century finds
experts at odds over the mission of public health. No two deans of the West's
major schools of public health agree on a definition of its goals and missions."
Definitional cacophony often accompanies the development of academic
disciplines; so, in some respects, disagreement among public health experts and
scholars on a definition of public health is both to be expected and intellectually
healthy. For public health, however, the definitional controversy provides a
window on concerns about the neglect of, and complacency about, public health
capabilities in many countries around the world. For Garrett, definitions have
policy implications: "In the absence of a coherent definition of the [public health]
discipline it was no wonder its advocates were struggling to defend their budgets
and policies. ' '
The conceptual controversies involving "public health" can also be seen
through public perceptions of this policy endeavor. Public health is often confused
with health care generally 24 or health care for the poor. Garrett has argued, for

15.

16.
(2002).
17.

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988).

Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 144, 145
LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 8 (2000).

18. Rothstein, supranote 16, at 145.
19. Id. at 144.
20. Ilan H. Meyer & Sharon Schwartz, Social Issues as Public Health: Promise and Peril, 90 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1189, 1189 (2000).
21. Michael H. Merson et al., Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH xviii (M. H. Merson et
al, eds., 2001).
22. GARRETT, supra note 17, at 6.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Legal scholars have, for example, taken pains to distinguish public health law from law that
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example, that: "In the United States 'public health' had become-incorrectlysynonymous with medicine for poor people. Few Americans at the millennium
thought of 'public health' as a system that functioned in their 'interests. Rather, it
was viewed as a government handout for impoverished people."
In addition to distinguishing public health from health care, Garrett's argument
emphasizes how the object of public health-the population-had in the United
States lost contact with, and respect for, public health as a policy and social
endeavor.
Ironically, public health was the victim of its own success in the United States
and other wealthy countries, especially with regard to public health's contributions
to reducing morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases. Progress against
infectious diseases was dramatic enough for the U.S. Surgeon General to declare in
the late 1960s that infectious diseases had been conquered, freeing the nation's
public health and medical resources to combat non-communicable diseases, such
as cancer.
The epidemiological transition from communicable to noncommunicable disease threats that occurred in the developed world in the postWorld War II period weakened the visibility, role, and place of public health within
nation-states. "Public health in the wealthy world," observed Garrett, "struggled
to
27
maintain respect, funding, and self-definition in the late twentieth century.,
Interestingly, a similar phenomenon affected public health in the international
realm. The field of "international health" became closely, if not entirely, associated
with improving health conditions and services in poor, developing countries. For
developed countries, international health activities, such as those undertaken by the
World Health Organization (WHO), became predominantly matters of
humanitarianism that did not directly affect the national interests of richer, more
affluent countries. Again, the developed world's success at reducing its infectious
disease morbidity and mortality played a significant role in international health
becoming almost purely a humanitarian endeavor. As I argued elsewhere:
[T]he national interest of developed states in the international control of
infectious diseases was weakened by the impact, and perceived future
impact, of adequate public health systems and antimicrobial
pharmaceuticals. During most of the post-1945 period, then, the
internationalization of public health has held marginal interest for
developed countries that view it merely as a means for developing states to
transition toward improved public health. 2'

regulates medicine and health care. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 3-4 (2000); JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 10 (2d. ed., 1939).
25. GARRETr, supra note 17, at 8.
26.

See Emerging Infections: A Significant Threat to the Nation's Health: Hearings Before the Senate

Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Senator Kassebaum).
27. GARRETt, supra note 17, at 11.
28.

David

P. Fidler,

The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
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International public health efforts were, to paraphrase Garrett, viewed in
developed nations as governmental and intergovernmental handouts to poor
people.
Both the examples from public health in the United States and internationally
suggest that the state of infectious disease control in developed societies
significantly influences how public health is conceptualized and the policy status of
public health activities. The conceptual incoherency of public health definitions
noted above and the policy neglect of public health nationally and internationally
correspond to the "conquest" of infectious diseases in developed nations. Should
infectious diseases grow as a threat to developed states, this hypothesis would
predict that public health's conceptual incoherency would be challenged and its
policy importance elevated.
The increasing threats posed by infectious diseases have been a powerful
engine in the policy revolution that has occurred in public health in the last decade.
As examined in more detail later in this article, 9 changing perceptions in the
developed world, especially the United States, about pathogenic threats has been
central to the elevation of public health as a matter of homeland security, national
security, foreign policy, and global governance. Contemporary debates about the
meaning of "public health" are also indicia of a new status because what public
health means now has more significance.
These observations suggest that how we understand public health and
conceptualize infectious disease threats depends on, or is heavily influenced by, the
perspective of the powerful. The following sections elaborate on this idea by
analyzing changes in how pathogenic threats have been constructed over two
historical periods of international public health activity. This analysis focuses on
two competing paradigms for conceptualizing pathogenic threats-the "power"
and the "paradise" paradigms. Borrowing from Kagan's analysis of the differing
U.S. and European world views, 3' I argue that these two paradigms offer competing
visions of how the world should approach mounting threats from infectious
diseases. Then, I examine the shift that has occurred in the last decade from the
paradise to the power perspective and the implications of this shift for global
infectious disease activities specifically and global public health generally.3
B. ConceptualizingPathogenicThreats: Two Paradigms
1. Powerand Public Health
The core of Kagan's analysis of the diverging world views of the United States
and Europe involves differing attitudes toward power. Europeans, Kagan argues,
InternationalRelations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 29 (1997).

29.
30.
31.

See infra Part IV.
KAGAN, supra note 8.
See infra Part III.
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are moving "beyond power" while the United States embraces power and its
exercise.32 Utilizing Kagan's power-oriented analysis in the context of public health
and infectious diseases might strike many people as odd, especially people in the
fields of public health and international relations. Power-related analysis
traditionally has been the purview of the study of international relations, not public
health.33 Historically, the disciplines of international relations and public health
have not been connected in any kind of dialogue. Kelley Lee and Anthony Zwi
argued that "little attention has been devoted to health in the I[nternational]
R[elations] field, 34 and Kickbusch has likewise noted "the gulf that divides
scholars of policy/International Relations and public health."35
The revolution that has occurred in public health in the last decade provides
evidence that the "traditions of mutual neglect ' 3 6 between public health and
international relations are breaking down.37 As discussed more below, 8 arguments
that infectious diseases represent national security threats to the United States bring
public health and power directly together. Similarly, the emergence of public
health as an issue on national security and foreign policy agendas affects how
power and its exercise are perceived. Kickbusch has argued, for example, that the
United States should utilize its hegemonic position in international politics to build
a "soft-power leadership role" in the global public health area.9

32. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 3.
33. The concept of power has been a central theme of the study of international relations. As Hans
Morgenthau famously wrote, "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power." HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5 (5th ed. rev. 1978). One
of the dominant theories of international relations, realism, places power at the center of its analysis of
international politics. Realist thinkers place, thus, the material capabilities of the state (e.g., economic and
military power) at the forefront of their explanations of international relations. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Legro &
Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SEC. 5 (1999); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).

34. Kelley Lee & Anthony Zwi, A Global PoliticalEconomy Approach to AIDS: Ideology, Interests and
Implications,in HEALTH IMPACrS OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 3, at 13.
35. Kickbusch, supra note 5, at 192.
36. David P. Fidler, Diseaseand GlobalizedAnarchy: TheoreticalPerspectives on the Pursuit of Global
Health, I SOC. THEORY & HEALTH 21, 25 (2003).
37. For a good example of the breaking down of these disciplinary barriers, see ANDREW PRICE-SMITH,
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: INFECTIOUS DISEASE, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT (2001).

38. See infra Part IV.
39. Ilona Kickbusch, Influence and Opportunity: Reflections on the U.S. Role in Global Public Health,
21 HEATLH AFF. 131, 138 (2002).
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Further, the traditions of mutual neglect between the disciplines of public health
and international relations do not mean that power has played no role in public health
generally and infectious disease control specifically. The disproportionate infectious4
disease burden that developing countries suffer compared to developed countries 0
can be seen as a function of power inequalities in the international system.4' Paul
Farmer's call for a "critical epistemology of emerging infectious diseases" focused
attention on underlying social inequalities connected to the distribution of political
and economic power.42
In short, power is very much in play in analyzing contemporary public health
and infectious disease issues. Kagan's analysis of U.S. and European world views
is helpful in the context of infectious diseases because the views he ascribes to the
United States and the countries of the European Union have parallels in the world
politics of public health. Thus, two perspectives are discernable with respect to
pathogenic threats-a perspective that views such threats through the lens of
power, and another that seeks to move "beyond power" in approaching infectious
disease problems through individual rights, human solidarity, and universal justice.
The next sections elaborate on these two perspectives.
Before I begin this elaboration, a caveat about my approach is in order. My
analysis of two perspectives does not mean that other ways of conceptualizing the
threat from infectious diseases are non-existent. As with many other controversial
global issues, analyses do not always appear in stark black and white because
shades of grey permeate not only commentary but also policy. Setting out sharply
defined perspectives can, however, contribute insights to complex developments,
as the widespread consumption of Kagan's analysis of U.S. and European world
views illustrates.
2.

The "Power" Paradigm:Infectious Diseases as Exogenous Threats to
NationalInterests and Power

Although infectious diseases have been wreaking havoc on human societies for
millennia,43 they did not become a serious subject of international diplomatic
activity until the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to the emergence of international
health diplomacy at the 1851 International Sanitary Conference, states handled the
threats posed by infectious diseases at predominantly a national level, through such
policies as cordon sanitaire,quarantine, and requirements for "bills of health" from
40. MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, supra note 6, at 8 ("While the true burden of infectious diseases
in many areas of the world is unknown, the greatest burden occurs within developing countries, where an
estimated one in every two persons dies from such a disease.").
41. Kickbusch, supra note 39, at 138 (arguing that "the global-health gap is about power").
42.

Paul Farmer, Social Inequalities and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2 EMERGING INFECTIOUS

DISEASES 259 (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol2no4/farmer.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also PAUL FARMER, INFECTIONS AND INEQUALITIES:
THE MODERN PLAGUES (1999).
43.

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. MCNEIL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES (1976).
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vessels arriving from foreign ports. 44 Although strictly national in scope, such
policies reflected an understanding that international trade and commerce were
channels for the spread of infectious diseases. The behavior of governments
revealed that states conceived of infectious diseases, in the context of international
relations, as exogenous threats against which national defenses (e.g., quarantine)
had to be constructed.
This state-centric outlook is a central feature of the "power" paradigm. Even
after states realized that uncoordinated national "defenses" against disease
importation were not effective and began international cooperation on infectious
disease control, the cooperation involved finding ways for states to improve their
national defenses against the importation of disease from foreign sources. The
infectious diseases targeted for international cooperation in the first century of
international health diplomacy reveal how states tailored their cooperative
endeavors to strengthen themselves against exogenous disease threats. The
infectious diseases of diplomatic concern were diseases that experts perceived were
spread by international transportation, such as plague, cholera, and yellow fever. 45
Some infectious diseases spread by international travel and trade, such as
tuberculosis, were not the subject of international cooperation because they were
already endemic in the states most concerned about exogenous disease threats-the
great powers of Europe and North America. As historians of international health
diplomacy have pointed out, European fears of "Asiatic" diseases (e.g., cholera)
drove states into international cooperation." The power paradigm's focus on
infectious diseases as exogenous threats to the state did not, thus, generally
incorporate all infectious diseases that may move in the streams of international
transportation but only those which were alien and thus more threatening to
population health in European and North American countries. 47
44. See NEVILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK 23-52
(2nd ed. 1971) (analyzing pre- 1851 efforts at controlling cross-border spread of infectious diseases).
45. For example, the convention and regulations drafted at the 1851 International Sanitary Conference
addressed cholera, plague, and yellow fever and had provisions that allowed a state to take measures against
ships "having on board a disease reputed to be importable." Id. at 46. Similarly, the preamble of the
International Sanitary Convention of 1903 stated that its aim was "to establish in a single arrangement the
measures calculated to safeguard the public health against the invasion and propagation of plague and cholera..
International Sanitary Convention, Dec. 3, 1903, 35 Stat. 1770, 1 BEVANS 359.
46. Norman Howard-Jones, Origins of InternationalHealth Work, BRIT. MED. J. 1032, 1035 (May 6,
1950) (arguing that what motivated the beginning of international cooperation on infectious diseases was "not a
wish for the general betterment of the health of the world, but the desire to protect certain favoured (especially
European) nations from contamination by their less-favoured (especially Eastern) fellows."). For an overview of
how the European desire to protect itself from "Asiatic" diseases was reflected in the international legal
agreements concluded between 1851 and 1951, see DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECfIOUS
DISEASES 28-35 (1999).
47. The most expansive list of diseases subject to a treaty was contained in the Pan American Sanitary
Code of 1924, which obliged states parties to report cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus,
meningitis, poliomyelitis, encephalitis, influenza, and typhoid and para-typhoid fevers. Pan American Sanitary
Code, Nov. 14, 1924, art. 3, 86 LNTS 43. The Pan American Sanitary Code placed, however, special emphasis
on the immediate reporting of cases of "plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus or any other dangerous
contagion liable to be spread through the intermediary agency of international commerce." Id. at art. 4. The
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The history of international cooperation on infectious diseases between the
mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries also reveals that the great powers
played the leading role in constructing the power paradigm. In this 100-year
period, the great powers led international cooperation on infectious diseases for
two reasons. First, the repeated "invasions" of "Asiatic" diseases adversely affected
populations and economic conditions in leading powers, such as Britain, France,
and the United States.4' Such invasions adversely affected a nation's material
capabilities and assets, which provided the foundation for its power in the
international system. Thus, a state's power had to be better protected against direct
exogenous infectious disease threats.
Second, the great powers took the lead on international infectious disease
control because the decentralized, uncoordinated system of national defenses
against disease importation began to impose increasingly significant burdens on
international trade, especially as advances in transportation technologies (e.g., the
steam ship and railroads) increased the speed and volume of international traffic.49

Great trading nations, such as Britain, were particularly keen to reduce the drag
national quarantine systems created for commercial interests. Here, infectious
diseases as an international problem posed an indirect threat to a state's national
interests and power, by triggering widespread trade-restricting health measures that
frustrated the promotion of foreign trade and the accumulation of economic wealth
from such trade.
The power paradigm appears, thus, to contain contradictory aims: (1) reduce
exogenous disease threats through improved national defenses; and (2) reduce the
friction national defenses against exogenous disease threats create for international
trade and commerce. The development of international health diplomacy in the
latter half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century
demonstrated that the only way the great powers could reconcile policy responses
to the direct and indirect disease threats posed to their national interests and power
was through international cooperation. The exogenous sources of both direct and
indirect threats meant that states, even the great powers, had to construct a
cooperative regime to mitigate the damage infectious diseases could cause to their
national interests and power. This reasoning helps explain the many treaties on
infectious disease control adopted during the 1851-1951 period., °
International Sanitary Convention of 1926 also included diseases beyond cholera, plague, and yellow fever by
adding typhus and smallpox to the list of diseases subject to the treaty's rules. See International Sanitary
Convention, June 21, 1926, art. 1, 2 BEVANS 545.
48. L. S. WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 223 (1916) (recording six invasions of cholera into
Europe in the nineteenth century); GOODMAN, supra note 44, at 38 (describing cholera epidemics in Europe and
North America in the nineteenth century).
49. NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY
CONFERENCES 1851-1938, at 11 (1975) (arguing that "[i]f, in the old colonial days, it was true that 'trade
follows the flag,' it was equally true that the first faltering steps toward international health cooperation
followed trade"); GOODMAN, supra 44, at 389 (noting that trade interests in harmonized quarantine measures
was one of the two most powerful motivations for international health cooperation).
50. For a list of these treaties, see FIDLER, supra note 46, at 22-23.
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The international legal regime on infectious disease control constructed
between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries attempted to provide rules
to allow states to achieve their objectives with respect to the direct and indirect
exogenous threats infectious diseases created."' The "classical regime" for
international infectious disease control sought to increase protection against the
international spread of disease with minimal impact on international trade and
travel." The classical regime contained two basic sets of substantive rules.
Under the first set of rules, states had to notify other countries about outbreaks
of specified diseases in their territories and maintain adequate public health
capabilities at points of disease exit and entry. The International Sanitary
Convention of 1926 provides examples of both of these kinds of rules. Article 1 of
the 1926 Convention required states parties to notify each other of cases of
"plague, cholera, or yellow fever discovered in its territory" and the "existence of
an epidemic of typhus or smallpox."53 Article 14 of this treaty obliged states parties
"to maintain in and around their large ports and, as far as possible, in and around
their other ports, a sanitary service possessing an organization and equipment
capable of carrying out the application of the prophylactic measures in the case of
"5A
diseases coming under this Convention ....
These rules supported the objective of strengthening protection against the
international spread of disease. The notification duties created a system of
international surveillance that provided national authorities with better information
on what diseases may be moving in international commerce, increasing the
likelihood of rapid, appropriate interventions at the national level to prevent
devastating disease invasions. The requirements for maintaining certain public
health capabilities at ports, airports, or other border crossing-points (e.g., keeping
rat populations at ports under control; providing clean water and proper sanitation
facilities for travelers) sought to prevent these gateways of international traffic
from becoming vectors of disease transmission.
The second set of rules contained principles that established the maximum
trade-restricting measures a state could take against trade and travelers arriving
from foreign destinations experiencing outbreaks of specified diseases. For
example, the International Sanitary Convention of 1926 provided that "[t]he
measures as provided in this Chapter must be regarded as constituting a maximum
within the limits of which Governments may regulate the procedure to be applied
to ships on their arrival. 55 The maximum measures prescribed in the rules were
based on scientific and public health principles to ensure that any restrictions on

51.

For an overview of the historical development of this regime, see id. at 21-57.

52. David P. Fidler, Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious Disease
Control, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 285, 286 (2003).

53.

International Sanitary Convention of 1926, supra note 47, at art. 1.

54.

Id. at art. 14.

55.

Id.aart. 15.
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international traffic were justified." This second set of rules supported the objective
of minimizing the interference with international traffic caused by national public
health measures. These rules, in essence, sought to effect a harmonization of
national defenses against disease importation based on scientifically valid criteria.57
The classical regime provides, thus, a window on the power paradigm.
Infectious diseases are conceptualized as direct and indirect exogenous threats to
the state's national interests and power in the international system. The substantive
rules of this state-centric regime are designed to shore up the state's national
defenses against the importation of a limited number of epidemic diseases, reduce
the prospects that the infrastructure of international traffic would facilitate crossborder disease transmission, and limit trade-restricting health measures to only
those scientifically necessary to prevent disease importation.
These rules appear universally applicable on their face; but they were, in fact,
conceived and constructed to serve primarily the interests of the great powers-the
states that felt vulnerable to "exotic" disease importation and the economic costs
national disease defenses in other countries exacted on their international trade.58
The classical regime had little relevance for countries where "Asiatic" diseases
were endemic and which did not have extensive trading interests around the world
frustrated by vexatious quarantine systems.
The classical regime reveals other important features of the state-centric,
national-interest driven power paradigm. Beyond the rules pertaining to public
health capabilities at points of disease entry and exit, the classical regime contained
nothing that addressed a state's domestic public health infrastructure or
capabilities. Thus, whether a state neglected public health internally, causing its
population to suffer from unnecessary infectious disease morbidity and mortality,
was not an issue. Such neglect was relevant only to the extent that it played a role
in cross-border disease transmission; but, even in that context, the classical regime
contained no requirements for domestic public health improvements. A state's
incentive to improve its domestic public health came from reducing the likelihood
that domestic disease problems would escape its borders, causing that state's
outbound trade and travel to suffer from the restrictions applied by other states to
keep diseases out of their territories.
The absence of rules on a state's domestic public health performance also
demonstrates that the power paradigm was not focused on, or even interested in,
the health of individuals. Whether individuals have access to adequate sanitation or

56. Fidler, supra note 52, at 286.
57. For a historical overview of the objective of harmonizing quarantine systems, see FIDLER, supra note
46, at 35-42.
58. GOODMAN, supra note 44, at 389.
Fear of the spread of cholera and, later, plague and yellow fever, together with the obvious
economies to trade in a uniform system of quarantine were the two motivations in international
health for seventy years or so. The third motive, a sense of responsibility towards one's
neighbours, came much later.
Id.
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personal medical services was simply not a concern of the classical regime. The
power paradigm conceptualized individuals as cross-border disease vectors that
states could regulate to protect themselves from disease importation. The only
point at which the power paradigm resonated positively for non-state actors,
including merchants and corporations, concerned the rules minimizing the
interference with commercial activity that trade-restricting health measures could
cause.
In many respects, the power paradigm reflects the structure and dynamics of
international politics during the era when infectious diseases became a subject of
diplomatic attention. The first 100 years of international health diplomacy occurred
during the heyday of the "Westphalian" system of international relations. The
moniker "Westphalian" refers to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, an event marked
by historians of international relations and international law as the conceptual and
practical beginning of the modem interstate system. 9 A few, central features
characterized the Westphalian system of international relations. First and foremost,
Westphalian international politics focused almost exclusively on the state and the
interactions among states.' ° Other actors in international relations, such as
merchants and missionaries, were not considered central to the political dynamics
of the system. Given this state-centric outlook on international relations, the
emergence of the power paradigm and its state-centric conception of infectious
disease threats during the heyday of Westphalian international politics is hardly
surprising.
Second, power politics dominated the Westphalian system of interstate
relations. In this system, the great powers and relations among them played a
special role in the dynamics of international relations. Infectious diseases emerged
as an international issue into a political system controlled by a handful of powerful
countries, each of which kept a wary eye on potential rivals as part of the balance
of power politics. 62 These power-driven rivalries fueled the scramble for imperial
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Christopher Harding & C. L. Lim, The Significance of Westphalia: An Archaeology of the

InternationalLegal Order, in RENEGOTIATING WESTPHALIA: ESSAYS AND COMMENTARY ON THE EUROPEAN
AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (Christopher Harding & C. L. Lim
eds., 1999).

As an event in the history of international relations the Treaty of Westphalia symbolically
indicated a sea-change in international organization-the transition to a system of sovereign
states, as sovereigns subject to no higher or competing authority and conveniently determining
the number and character of their legal relations with each other.
Id.
60. Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalizationof World Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13, 20 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2001) ("The

Westphalian system was a states-system.").
61.
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(1977) (analyzing the role of the great powers in relation to international order).
62.
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POLITICS, supra note 60, at 35, 43 (noting that the balance of power was one of the basic principles of
Westphalian international politics).
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possessions that characterizes much of late nineteenth century international
relations, as epitomized by the European great powers carving up Africa into
6
spheres of influence at the 1885 Conference of Berlin. " In such an environment, it
would have been incredibly radical for governments of the great powers not to
conceptualize infectious disease problems as exogenous threats to national interests
and power.
Third, the Westphalian system exhibited strong support for keeping
international relations strictly international.Thus, what happened inside a state
between its government and people was not a legitimate concern of diplomacy or
international law. 64 Infectious diseases emerged as an international issue in a
political system heavily marked by strong support for principles of near-absolute
65
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. The lack
of rules in the classical regime of addressing domestic public health capabilities of
states is, thus, also not surprising.
The power paradigm does not explain every aspect of public health endeavors
against infectious diseases in the first 100 years of international health diplomacy.
As the subsequent analysis of the "paradise" paradigm below makes clear,
developments leading to a different way of conceptualizing infectious disease
threats had origins when the power paradigm held sway. Providing a brief outline
of the main features of the power paradigm will, however, provide a backdrop for
analyzing the radically different perspective that developed in the latter half of the
twentieth century.
3. The "Paradise"Paradigm:Infectious Diseases as Threats to Individual
Rights, Human Solidarity, and Universal Justice
As indicated above, the power paradigm on infectious diseases developed in
the century following the first international sanitary conference in 1851. The
beginning of the second century of international health diplomacy after the end of
World War II contained important signals that the next century's perspective on
infectious diseases would be different. The Preamble of the WHO Constitution,
66
which was drafted in 1946 and came into effect in 1948, contained a bold, new
vision of public health not at all in concert with the power paradigm. Each
provision of the Preamble supported a perspective on public health utterly different

63.

See F. H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY

OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES (1963) (discussing the Conference of Berlin).
64. Jackson, supra note 62, at 43 (noting the development of the principle of non-intervention from the
Westphalian norm of cujus regio, ejus religio, the ruler determines the religion of the realm).
65. For example, Article 2 of the Statutes of Constitution of the International Office of Public Health
adopted in 1907 provided that "[tihe Office may not interfere in any way in the administration of the different
States." Rome Agreement Establishing the International Office of Public Health, Dec. 9, 1907, reprinted in
GOODMAN, supra note 44, at 101, 102.
66. Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, reprinted in
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS (40th ed. 1994), at 1 [hereinafter WHO Const.].
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from the power paradigm's conceptualization of infectious diseases as exogenous
threats to a nation's interests and power.
The first principle of the Preamble of the WHO Constitution declared: "Health
is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity."67 This attempt to provide a definition of "health"
departed radically from the power paradigm, which did not formulate a view of
"health" per se. The power paradigm saw "health" in aggregate terms-how
disease invasion affected a country's population. At most, "health" was merely the
absence of widespread disease in the population. 68 The definition of health in the
WHO Constitution's Preamble emphasizes that the member states of this new
international organization reject the notion that health is merely the absence of
disease in order to promote a more holistic concept of health within the realm of
international health cooperation.
The second way the WHO Constitution's definition of health deviates radically
from the power paradigm is that it focuses attention on the health of the individual.
The declaration that health is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing contains a vision of each individual's health status. Although one could
argue that the definition of health in the WHO Constitution can be applied to the
health of a nation, the definition only very awkwardly resonates with health at a
population level. As argued above, the power paradigm was not concerned with, or
interested in, whether individuals within sovereign states enjoyed a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being.
The second principle enunciated in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution is:
"The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition." ' This principle became known as
the human "right to health," and the WHO Constitution was the first major
international legal document to proclaim health as a fundamental human right.7°
This principle in the WHO Constitution holds that individuals should be able to
assert their right to health against their respective governments in connection with
their health. Under the power paradigm, a government's relationship with its
67. Id.
68. The statutes of the International Office of Public Health adopted in 1907 serve as an example for this
point because they provide that
[tihe principle object of the Office is to collect and bring to the knowledge of the participating
States the facts and documents of a general character which relate to public health, and
especially as regards infectious diseases, notably, cholera, plague, and yellow fever, as well as
the measures taken to combat these diseases.
Rome Agreement Establishing the International Office of Public Health, art. 4, reprinted in GOODMAN, supra
note 44, at 102.
69. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.
70. BRIGIT C. A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT To HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15
(1999) (noting that the WHO Constitution "is the first international human rights document to formulate an
individual's right to health"). The right to health forms part of human rights treaties adopted later, including the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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citizens on health status and services was not a diplomatic question or issue. By
contrast, the WHO Constitution placed this relationship seemingly at the heart of
international cooperation on public health.
The third principle in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution declared: "The
health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is
dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States."'" In what can
only be called a breathtaking assertion, the WHO Constitution linked international
peace and security with the health of all peoples. This principle contains a
universalism alien to the power paradigm's state-centric conceptualization of
infectious disease threats. In addition, the explicit linking of the health of all
peoples and international peace and security is nothing short of absurd under the
tenets of the power paradigm. How would the failure to achieve a complete state of
physical, mental, and social well-being in poor, powerless, countries threaten order
and stability between the great powers? Again, the Preamble of the WHO
Constitution appears to be drafted in a manner that directly rejects the
conceptualization of public health that dominated in the previous historical period.
The fourth principle of the Preamble provided: "The achievement of any State
72
in the promotion and protection of health is of value to all., This principle
presents health, and the benefits the achievement of health creates, as organically
connected on a universal scale. The "value to all" in the principle can be conceived
in two distinct ways. First, one nation's promotion and protection of its people's
health generate positive externalities for other nations in the form, for example, of
73
a more attractive export market (i.e., healthier people are better consumers).
Second, a nation's successful health promotion and protection activities can offer
intangible benefits to other countries by, for example, serving as a model for policy
reform and strengthening universal respect for individual and public health. None
of these ideas-not even the idea that the status of health in one country can affect
another country's export opportunities-found expression in the power paradigm.
Britain never pressured, say, Germany to improve the health of German nationals
so that British manufacturers could export more products to healthier German
citizens.74 How Germany treated the health of its people was not the subject matter
of international health cooperation. The WHO Constitution promotes an entirely
different outlook on health promotion and protection within countries, connecting
such activities to all other nations.

71. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.
72. Id.
73. William H. Foege, Memorandum to the President: Global Health and U.S. National Interests, in
BIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 1, at 17, 24 (arguing that "healthy societies provide
better markets for U.S. goods and healthy societies are able to provide less expensive goods for sale to the
United States").
74. Arguments such as this were, however, made by Great Britain in connection with restricting the
alcohol trade to indigenous peoples in the Pacific Ocean. The British were concerned that alcohol abuse was
harming the ability of indigenous peoples of the Pacific region to buy British goods. See JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 229 (1906).
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The fifth principle in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution asserted the
following: "Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health
and control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger."75
This principle holds that countries with good health standards will be threatened by
poor health standards in other countries, particularly if such poor health conditions
contribute to the cross-border transmission of infectious diseases. Poor, weak
countries will be microbial incubators connected to the disease vectors of
international trade and travel, all of which places healthy countries at risk for
disease importation. The policy prescription flowing from this principle is, thus,
greater attention to raising the health standards of countries struggling to promote
and protect health in their territories. Stronger, wealthier countries have a direct
self-interest in supporting financially, technologically, and with technical
assistance the health efforts of less affluent nations.76
The appeal to the self-interest of more powerful states is something that would
resonate with the power paradigm, but this paradigm never developed rules or
arrangements to facilitate redistribution of resources and technology to improve the
health conditions of poor countries. The power paradigm's approach to the
microbial incubator problem was the existence of incentives (e.g., the application
of trade-restricting health measures by importing countries) for poor countries to
confront the problem directly-improve their own public health or not be able to
benefit significantly from participating in international trade and travel.
The Preamble's sixth principle stated: "Healthy development of the child is of
basic importance; the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment
is essential to such development."" This principle can be seen as a corollary of the
Preamble's principles on the definition of health and the right to health. The
corollary emphasizes the special importance of health in the development of
children. Thus, the right to health has particularly powerful connotations for child
development." This principle also highlights health threats to one of the most
vulnerable parts of a country's population. The message sent is that health policy
should protect the most vulnerable in society and work to mitigate such
vulnerability. All this is alien to the power paradigm, which developed no
sensitivity to the special health needs of children or any other vulnerable segment
of the population.
The seventh principle of the Preamble of the WHO Constitution declared:
"The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related

75. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.
76. Foege, supra note 73, at 24 (Arguing that "the United States receives direct and indirect health
benefits when involved in improving the health of developing countries. Direct risks decrease for travelers and
importation risks are reduced. In addition, we benefit from improved security and economic opportunities.").
77. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.
78. This idea is later enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,
1989, art. 24, 28 I.L.M. 1456.
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knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health." This principle holds
that universal and equitable access to scientific, medical, and health care
technologies and knowledge is fundamental to achieving the holistic definition of
s
health and fulfilling the human right to health.' It also connects to the fifth
principle's emphasis on the need for the redistribution of material resources among
rich and poor countries to raise the standard of health equitably on a universal
basis."' Apart from creating requirements for states to notify disease outbreaks and
limits on trade- and travel-restricting health measures, the power paradigm was a
"self-help" system not informed by principles of universal, equitable access to
health technologies and knowledge achieved through resource redistribution.
The Preamble's eighth principle provided: "Informed opinion and active cooperation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement
of the health of the people."8'2 This principle contains a vision of public health as a
participatory, democratic endeavor within states. Informed opinion requires the
free flow of information and debate about health policy and other policy areas with
a bearing on health. Active cooperation on the part of the public involves a vision
of vibrant civil society participation, with the government, in seeking the
attainment of the highest possible level of health. Each element of this principle
looks past the border of the sovereign state to enquire into how governments
organize their health systems and their health politics. Such scrutiny of a state's
internal health affairs had no place in the power paradigm because it was informed
by strong notions of sovereignty and non-intervention.
The ninth principle in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution asserted:
"Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be
3
fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures." As with
many other principles in the Preamble, this tenet focuses on what happens inside
states, not what happens between states, as the power paradigm does. The position
that governments have responsibilities for the health of their populations that can
be fulfilled only by providing health and other kinds of social services is perhaps
not, in itself, a new idea. Public health has, for example, long been considered a
"public good" that only governments can adequately provider"Other principles in
the Preamble give government responsibility for health a profoundly different
meaning, especially the idea that health is a fundamental human right. The
responsibility of the government for its people's health is, thus, based not in

79. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.
80. Later human rights treaties incorporate aspects of this idea, including the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 70, at Article 15. 1(b) (states parties recognizing "the right of
everyone: ... (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications").
81. WHO Const., supranote 66, pmbl., at 2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 7; GOSTIN, supra note 24, at 4.
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utilitarian, materialistic thinking (as with the power paradigm) but in the basic right
of human beings to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health.
This extended discussion of the Preamble of the WHO Constitution outlines a
world view" on public health radically different from the "world view" found in
the power paradigm. My point is not that this new world view of public health, and
its implications for infectious disease control, suddenly became the reality of
international cooperation on health issues. In fact, after reading the rousing rhetoric
of the Preamble, the legally binding provisions of the WHO Constitution might
come as some disappointment. The only two obligations WHO member states
accepted in the main text of the Constitution were to pay their financial
contributions in a timely manner 85 and to submit certain reports to WHO on a
periodic basis." The WHO Constitution contains no legally binding provisions that
require WHO member states to engage in any specific health policy or practices
within their respective territories. The WHO Constitution leaves the exercise of
health sovereignty by states virtually unfettered. Ironically, the classical regime
regulates sovereignty more than the WHO Constitution despite being based in a
much less ambitious world view of public health.
The Preamble of the WHO Constitution expresses, however, a perspective on
public health almost completely at odds with the premises and assumptions
informing the power paradigm. This new perspective has profound implications for
conceptualizing threats posed by pathogenic microbes. Where the power paradigm
conceptualized infectious diseases as exogenous threats to a nation's materialistic
interests and power, the Preamble of the WHO Constitution places the health of the
individual at the center of attention, as illustrated by the proclamation that the right
to health is a fundamental human right.87 With such a focus, infectious disease
threats are not just exogenous but can also arise within a state, a perspective that
would widen the list of infectious diseases on which international cooperation
would be required.
The Preamble's concern for the health of individuals is not parochial in
orientation but has a universal scope because it incorporates the health of
individuals and peoples everywhere, not just those living in the great powers of the
international system. The emphasis on the interdependence of people's health,
particularly with respect to infectious diseases, supports the universalism in the
Preamble's vision. This perspective constructs infectious disease threats as much
more than "exotic" pathogenic microbes traveling across fixed borders through
international trade and travel.
Integrated into the individualism and universalism of the Preamble's principles
is a deep concern for those individuals and peoples most vulnerable to health risks,
especially the poor and children. In this new vision of public health, equitable
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access to healthy living conditions and health-related services both within and
among states is crucial. The principle of equity supports the tenet of human
solidarity found in the Preamble's universalism and champions the idea of redistributive justice both inside and between states. The Preamble's perspective
conceptualizes infectious disease threats, thus, as threats to global justice.
In this article, I call the perspective outlined in the Preamble of the WHO
Constitution the "paradise" paradigm. I use the term "paradise" to echo Kagan's
analysis of the world view of Europeans, which he argues is a "post-historical
paradise of peace and relative prosperity."" The Europeans, according to Kagan,
strive for this paradise by turning away from power politics toward a system driven
by the rule of law and cooperative justice. 89 As the contrasts with the power
paradigm make clear, the vision in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution turns its
back on thinking about health and infectious disease threats through the
Westphalian lenses of state-centrism, competitive national interests, and power.
The Preamble instead expresses a vision of health and infectious disease threats in
terms of individual rights, human solidarity, and universal justice.
I. PARADISE SHIFT: THE RISE OF THE PARADISE PARADIGM IN
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH

A. Introduction
After WHO's creation in 1948, international public health efforts on infectious
diseases had two competing visions in play-the power and paradise paradigms.
The power paradigm continued in the post-World War II period through WHO's
continuation of the classical regime on infectious disease control in the form of the
International Sanitary Regulations of 1951, which WHO later renamed the
International Health Regulations (IR). 90 The post-World War II era witnessed,
however, the rise of the paradise paradigm in the making of international health
policy. This part of the article examines how the paradise paradigm came to
replace the power paradigm as the controlling perspective on public health and
infectious disease threats within WHO and international health circles in the first
five decades of WHO's existence. Developments in connection with policy on
infectious diseases provide excellent material to illustrate the reality of this
"paradise shift" in international public health. Two events stand at the center of this
shift: (1) the collapse of the classical regime on international infectious disease
control, which was the progeny of the power paradigm (Part II.B); and (2) the

88. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 3.
89. Id.
90. International Health Regulations, July 25, 1969, reprinted in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3rd ann. ed. 1983) [hereinafter IHR]. On the IHR's connection with
the pre-WHO international law on infectious diseases, see Fidler, supra note 52, at 285-86.
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ascendance of new approaches to infectious disease problems echoing the tenets of
the paradise paradigm (Part uI.C).
B. Collapseof the ClassicalRegime: The FadingRelevance of the Power
Paradigm
In other writings, I have analyzed how the classical regime on international
infectious disease control established in the first hundred years of international
health diplomacy, and continued in the form of the IHR in the latter half of the
twentieth century, collapsed as an effective legal and policy approach to infectious
disease threats." I do not wish to repeat these detailed analyses here, but I want to
examine what the collapse of the classical regime tells us about the fading
relevance of the power paradigm in the post-World War II period. Thus, I
concentrate here less on the legal details than on the political dynamics behind the
failure of the IHR.
As noted in Part II, the classical regime on international infectious disease
control contained two interdependent substantive parts. First, countries were to
report outbreaks of specified diseases to other countries, usually through a
permanent international health organization. The IHR included such rules as well. 92
Second, countries were to limit their trade- and travel-restricting measures to those
prescribed by the classical regime to ensure that interference with international
traffic was justified from scientific and public health perspectives. The IHR also
incorporated this approach.93
By the late 1960s and 1970s, WHO officials and other experts recognized that
WHO member states were routinely ignoring their obligations to report specified
disease outbreaks
and refrain from excessive trade- and travel-restricting
94
measures. The IHR, in other words, collapsed from both ends. Although such
widespread non-compliance with international legal obligations raises questions
about WHO member states' respect for international law, the key question for my
purposes is how the power paradigm explains the unraveling of the classical
regime.
The classical regime arose out of the power paradigm's conceptualization of
infectious diseases as exogenous threats to the national interests and power of the
great powers of the international system. The collapse of the classical regime
would be expected if the great powers no longer considered infectious diseases
serious exogenous threats requiring international cooperation to shore up national
91.
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defenses against pathogenic invaders. The development of international public
health in the post-World War II period demonstrates that this hypothesis is correct.
European-led efforts to establish international cooperation on infectious
diseases in the nineteenth century arose from the convergence of two factors on
leading European states. First, increases in the speed and volume of international
travel made hitchhiking pathogens more dangerous to countries engaged in
extensive international commerce. 95 As the establishment of quarantine practices in
fifteenth century Italian city-states indicates, diseases have long been transmitted
along the highways and seaways of human mobility.9 Advances in transportation
technologies, such as the steam ship, increased the speed of international trade and
travel, producing efficiencies that fed a growth in the overall level of international
trade. 9
Second, with international trade and travel proving more effective vectors for
the spread of infectious diseases, the inadequacy or non-existence of public health
systems and capabilities in European states left their populations open to microbial
invasion and subsequent onward transmission within their territories."
Improvements in domestic public health defenses against infectious disease
importation and spread did not keep pace with the increase in the nature of the
pathogenic threat. The ever more stringent application of national quarantine
measures did little to stop cross-border disease transmission but much to irritate
merchants and their government supporters in the great trading nations of the time,
such as Britain.
The European great powers developed the classical regime to help address
their direct vulnerability to exogenous infectious disease threats. Should that
underlying vulnerability wane for reasons not connected to the operation of the
classical regime, then the interest of the great powers in the classical regime and
international infectious disease control would also wane. The logic of the power
paradigm explains what, in fact, happened. As mentioned earlier, two
developments weakened great power interest in international infectious disease
control. First, these states began to develop better national public health systems
through the building of safer, more effective sanitation and water systems in urban
areas. 99 Infectious disease morbidity and mortality in the more affluent parts of the
world was already decreasing significantly before World War II. This progress
partly informed arguments made by experts, such as Charles-Edward Winslow in
1943, that the United States and other developed nations were on the cusp of the
"conquest of epidemic disease." °°
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The second development-the discovery and widespread application of
antibiotics and vaccines-gave developed nations another powerful weapon with
which to reduce their vulnerability to infectious diseases.'0' The major public health
impact of antimicrobial pharmaceuticals came in the post-World War II period, and
this progress combined with the advances made in public health infrastructure and
practices in the first half of the twentieth century to make infectious diseases much
less of a problem than they had been a century before. The "conquest of epidemic
disease" envisioned by Winslow in 1943 became a reality, according to the U.S.
Surgeon General's announcement in the late 1960s that infectious diseases had
been conquered in the United States.t 2
These two developments meant that the great powers of international politics
no longer needed the classical regime to help address their vulnerability to
infectious disease threats. The direct and pressing concern these states had for
exogenous infectious disease threats disappeared throughout most of the postWorld War II period. The power paradigm had not disappeared; it was, in fact, still
working because, as the perception of the threat declined, so did great power
interest in, and direct support for, the classical regime and its objectives. But,
because great power interest in international infectious disease control waned, the
power paradigm faded as a relevant feature of both great power foreign policy and
international health policy at WHO.
C. ParadiseWaxing: The Evolution of InternationalHealth Policy
The decades that witnessed the fading relevance of the power paradigm also
saw international health policy, especially at WHO, evolve in the directions
outlined in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution. A comprehensive analysis of
the evolution of international health policy in the post-World War II era is beyond
the scope of this article, but highlighting salient features of this evolution is
sufficient to support my argument. Three developments stand out in the rise of the
paradise paradigm in international health policy: (1) a shift from horizontal to
vertical public health strategies on infectious diseases; (2) an increasing concern
with health conditions in developing countries; and (3) the formulation of a holistic
strategy to advance the right to health, universal health solidarism in the
international community, and redistributive justice on a global scale.
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The power paradigm's approach to the public health problem of infectious
diseases was entirely horizontal in nature (Figure 1). The classical regime
attempted to regulate cross-border transmission of infectious diseases by focusing
exclusively on how states interact with each other. The lack of any rles that
penetrated inside a state to address its domestic public health situation confirmed
the horizontal orientation of the power paradigm. As revealed by the principles in
the Preamble of the WHO Constitution, the paradise paradigm embraced a vertical
approach to public health-looking deep inside the state, down to the level of the
individual to accord the individual a fundamental human right to health (Figure 1).
The Preamble's concern with health equity involved not only equity between states
but also within states, another indication of its vertical public health perspective.
FIGURE 1. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
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At a more practical level, vertical public health strategies against infectious
diseases began to emerge as the dominant approach in international health policy.
Experts have noted that, earlier in its development, WHO began to supplement the
classical horizontal features of international health cooperation with vertical
activities that sought to reduce infectious disease problems at their source within
countries. Dyna Arhin-Tenkorang and Pedro Conceiqio traced, for example, the
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move by international health policy away from "at the border" controls (such as the
IHR address) to "meeting diseases at their sources."' 3 They argue that, after its
formation in 1948,
[iun a period of great vitality in the scientific understanding of infectious
diseases and of progress in medical technology-in vaccines for
prevention and drugs for treatment-the WHO added eliminating
communicable diseases at their sources to its mandate of containing their
spread through more traditional functions of coordinating international
health regulations and serving as an information clearinghouse.',4
Large-scale disease eradication efforts led by WHO, such as those for
smallpox (which succeeded)"" and for malaria (which failed),' °6 also reveal the
growing preference among international health experts for vertical strategies that
attacked infectious diseases as locally as possible. WHO also increasingly began to
focus its efforts on providing country-level technical assistance to help countries,
particularly those in the developing world, improve their national public health
capabilities."° Such assistance also connects to a vertical public health strategy
against infectious diseases.
The second major feature of the rise of the paradise paradigm is WHO's
penchant for focusing much of its attention on health conditions in the developing
world. In the late 1970s, Charles Pannenborg observed that WHO "discards in all
its principal policies both the first and the second world almost completely
focusing on the L[ess] D[eveloped] C[ountry]-world. '"'0' This turn towards the poor
resonates with the emphasis in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution on the
health needs of the most vulnerable populations and on the importance of equity in
access to health-related resources and services.' 9 WHO's focus on the developing
world also drew attention to the health gap existing between the rich and the poor
parts of humanity, underscoring that such inequalities were issues of universal
justice, not just national public health.
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The third feature of the rise of the paradise paradigm is the development of a
holistic strategy to advance the right to health, universal health solidarism in the
international community, and redistributive justice on a global scale. This strategy
was called "Health for All," and it is crystallized in the 1978 Declaration of AlmaAta issued by the WHO/UNICEF-sponsored International Conference on Primary
Health Care." ° The Declaration of Alma-Ata echoes directly the main principles in
the Preamble of the WHO Constitution, including the definition of health, the
concept of health as a fundamental human right, the problem of inequality of health
conditions between rich and poor, the right of people to participate in health policy,
and the responsibility of governments for the health of their people fulfilled by the
provision of health and social measures."' The Declaration of Alma-Ata also
connected health policy to larger concerns of justice in international relations by
linking progress on health to economic and social development based on the New
International Economic Order," 2 promulgated in the 1970s by developing countries
as a fundamental reordering of international economic relations.'
According to the Declaration of Alma-Ata, the "main social target of
governments, international organisations and the whole world community in the
coming decades should be the attainment by all peoples of the world by the year
2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically
productive life."' 1 4 The specific strategy selected in the Declaration of Alma-Ata to
achieve "[a]n acceptable level of health for all the people of the world by the year
2000'"" was "primary health care."'" 6 The Declaration defined primary health care
as
essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially
acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to
individuals and families in the community through their full participation
and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at
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every stage of 7their development in the spirit of self-reliance and selfdetermination."
These elements of the Declaration of Alma-Ata are sufficient to convey the
sense that this document, like the Preamble of the WHO Constitution,
conceptualized public health in ways light years from the power paradigm. The
power paradigm was only concerned with infectious diseases as exogenous threats
to the state. The primary health care strategy of the Declaration of Alma-Ata
included the infectious disease problem but went beyond it to include other kinds
of public health problems. The minimum core of primary health care, according to
the Declaration of Alma-Ata, includes:
education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of
preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper
nutrition; an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal
and child health care, including family planning; immunization against the
major infectious diseases; prevention and control of locally endemic
diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and
provision of essential drugs....18
This baseline content for primary health care illustrates the much more ambitious
vision Health for All represents than the one found in the power paradigm.
The promulgation of the Health for All strategy as the leading approach for
international health policy in the coming decades occurs at exactly the same time
WHO and other experts have recognized the failure of the classical regime as
embodied in the IHR. By the late 1970s, compliance with the IIR was poor, at
best, leading commentators to question whether the IHR made any contributions to
international infectious disease control." 9 In contrast to the collapse of the classical
regime, alternative infectious disease strategies were scoring victories. Disease
eradication efforts eliminated smallpox by the late 1970s, an achievement that
owes little, if anything, to the IHR. The formulation of the Health for All strategy
also radically departs from the framework found in the IHR to advance a
comprehensive strategy to assist governments and international health
organizations tackle infectious disease problems through the framework of
respecting the individual's fight to health, strengthening universalism in health
policy, and stressing the connections between health inequalities and the pursuit of
human justice. The Health for All strategy represents a historic moment when the
paradise paradigm's eclipsing of the classical regime and the power paradigm as
the driving force behind international health policy is completed.

117.

Id.

118.

Id. at 550.

119.

See generally sources cited supra note 94.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 35
IV. POWER SHIFT: EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND BIOTERRORISM

A. ParadiseLost: The Dismemberment of the ParadiseParadigm
The rise of the paradise paradigm in international health policy reached its
apogee with the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the launch of the Health for All
strategy at the end of the 1970s. The subsequent decade proved, however, a
disaster for the vision of public health contained in the Preamble of the WHO
Constitution and promoted by the Declaration of Alma-Ata. The historic
eradication of smallpox and the promulgation of the visionary Health for All
strategy at the end of the 1970s were almost immediately followed by the
emergence of a new plague, HIV/AIDS, which by the end of the 1980s had
become a global nightmare of growing proportions. 12° The HIV/AIDS pandemic
was a particularly cruel reminder, especially for developed countries, that
humankind had not conquered infectious diseases.
The 1980s also witnessed the prestige and influence of WHO in international
public health suffer, particularly under the leadership of Director-General
Nakajima. The HIV/AIDS pandemic appeared to catch WHO by surprise, creating
the impression that the Organization responded too slowly to a new disease threat.
Other complaints were made against WHO, including mismanagement and
corruption in the Organization and a loss of a sense of direction. 2' By the latter half
of the 1990s, public health experts lamented the ineffectiveness of WHO in the
face of mounting global health challenges and called for sweeping reforms in the
Organization. 1
The Declaration of Alma-Ata had linked its Health for All vision to the spirit
and demands of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a blueprint for
more equitable and just international economic relations developed and pushed by
developing countries during the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, the NIEO had
vanished from the world agenda, made irrelevant by the debt crisis that gripped the
developing world in that decade, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
communist alternative to liberal capitalism, and the increasing importance of the
processes of globalization. 123 At the end of the 1980s, events had bypassed the
Health for All-NIEO linkage, leaving it sounding quaint and anachronistic, more
like a museum exhibit than a vibrant vision of public health's future.
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Public health generally, and infectious disease control specifically, entered the
1990s in a climate of turmoil. This decade would prove to be another pivotal period
in the conceptualization of infectious disease threats, and the 1990s witnessed the
dramatic re-emergence of the power paradigm in thinking about infectious disease
threats. This part of the article analyzes the "power shift" that occurred in the area
of infectious disease policy in the 1990s and early 2000s. Two developments drove
the dynamics of the resurrection of the power paradigm-the phenomenon of
emerging infectious diseases (Part IV.C) and the rise of the threat of bioterrorism
(Part IV.D). As subsequent sections examine, the power paradigm returns with a
vengeance during this phase of public health history; but the paradigm also exhibits
new features that distinguish it from its older manifestation.
B. Revenge of the Germs: Emerging Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism
The power paradigm's structure and dynamics provide sufficient guidance to
anticipate what would be required for the paradigm to resurface in policy thinking
about infectious diseases. The driving force behind the power paradigm is the sense
of vulnerability of the great powers to pathogenic threats. The vulnerability of the
great powers to infectious disease threats in the latter half of the nineteenth century
arose because increased trade and travel, combined with inadequate national public
health infrastructures, produced fertile conditions for epidemic diseases.
Uncoordinated national efforts to address this heightened vulnerability did little to
stop border-hopping bugs but significantly burdened international commercial
activity, much to the displeasure of merchants and the governments of great trading
nations.
For the power paradigm to rise again, we would have to expect that the great
powers' sense of vulnerability to infectious diseases would increase significantly.
The article earlier noted that, during most of the post-World War II period, the
interest of the great powers in international infectious disease control waned
considerably because they had developed stronger national public health capabilities
and harnessed effectively the new arsenal of antimicrobial pharmaceuticals, which
allowed them to reduce infectious disease morbidity and mortality significantly. 2 4 A
renewed sense of vulnerability should arise, therefore, from a combination of three
factors: (1) trade and travel proving effective transmission routes for pathogenic
threats; (2) inadequate national public health capabilities to deal with global
microbial traffic; and (3) the declining effectiveness of the arsenal of antimicrobial
pharmaceuticals. As the analysis below of the phenomenon of emerging infectious
diseases shows, each of these factors was central to worries in the 1990s and early
2000s about the growing infectious disease threat.
The re-emergence of the power paradigm involves another significant factor
that was not present in the paradigm's original development-the rise of the threat
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of bioterrorism. Although the problem of biological weapons arose in the same
2
period as the development of the power paradigm,' it did not play a role in the
paradigm's conceptualization of infectious disease threats. The threat of biological
weapons generally, and bioterrorism specifically, plays, however, a huge role in the
return of the power paradigm. As explored more below, the main reason for this
significant impact is that exogenous threats to a nation's interests, security, and
power from the malevolent use of microbes fit the logic of the power paradigm like
a tailor-made glove. The impact of this seamless interface on conceptualizing
pathogenic threats in the twenty-first century is profound, and I explain this impact
in detail below.
C. The Crisis in Emerging Infectious Diseases
One of the most important developments in public health policy nationally and
internationally in the 1990s was the recognition that infectious diseases were
making a comeback, threatening population and individual health in both
developed and developing countries. WHO declared in 1996, for example, that the
world was confronting a crisis in the form of emerging infectious diseases. 16 Public
health experts defined "emerging infectious diseases" as "diseases of infectious
origin whose incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades or
' 7
threatens to increase in the near future."' This definition encompassed not only
diseases never previously identified, such as HIV/AIDS, but also diseases that
8
many thought had been subdued, such as tuberculosis.'2
A comprehensive description of the emerging infectious disease phenomenon
29
is beyond the scope of this article,' but central to my argument are the political
dynamics of the crisis in emerging infectious diseases and how these dynamics
connect to the logic of the power paradigm. The "crisis in emerging infectious
diseases" becomes politically important because of the engagement of the great
powers, particularly the United States, with this issue. This engagement signaled a
new sense of vulnerability developing on the part of the great powers concerning
naturally occurring pathogenic threats.
The return of the power paradigm can be seen clearly by examining how the
emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases was being conceptualized in
the 1990s. Much of the early and most prominent analysis on emerging infectious
diseases came from the United States, the leading great power in the international
125. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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system. The U.S. Institute of Medicine issued a seminal report in 1992 on
mounting microbial threats to health in the United States."o The U.S. government
followed the Institute of Medicine's lead by examining the threat of emerging
infectious diseases. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published
its first report on emerging infectious diseases, Addressing Emerging Infectious
Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategyfor the United States, in 1994.3' In 1995, a
U.S. government interagency working group released Infectious Disease-A
Global Health Threat, which studied the dangers that infectious disease resurgence
created for U.S. foreign policy and national security."
The U.S. government continued to elevate emerging infectious diseases as a
matter of U.S. foreign policy concern in the latter half of the 1990s. Vice President
Gore announced a new national initiative to address emerging infectious diseases
in 1996, arguing that "there is no more menacing threat to global health today than
emerging infectious diseases."' 33 Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, described the Clinton administration as waging war on infectious
diseases. 134 The United States placed the threat of emerging infectious diseases on
diplomatic agendas, such as bilateral diplomacy with Russia and South Africa, G7
summit meetings, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.'35 In the last
year of the Clinton administration, the National Intelligence Council of the Central
Intelligence Agency issued a now famous intelligence estimate that assessed the
threat of infectious diseases in terms of U.S. foreign policy and national security
interests.136 These activities, and others, stimulated a host of analyses that
conceptualized emerging infectious diseases as exogenous threats to foreign policy
and national security interests.137
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These efforts to elevate emerging infectious diseases as a U.S. foreign policy
and national security concern resonate with the power paradigm. The substantive
tenor and purpose of these analyses do not reflect the vision for public health and
infectious disease control contained in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution and
the Declaration of Alma-Ata. Framing infectious diseases as an exogenous threat to
U.S. foreign policy and national security conceptualizes pathogenic threats in the
same manner as the power paradigm.
One way to illustrate the parallels between much of the literature on emerging
infectious diseases and the power paradigm is to examine how infectious disease
problems in the developing world were being framed as problems. The very
moniker "emerging infectious diseases" denotes a focus attuned to developed
countries rather than developing nations. For many parts of the developing world,
infectious diseases never disappeared as a source of sickness, disability, and death.
The Institute of Medicine's Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats in the 21st
Century observed in 2003 that:
Most developing nations have not shared fully in the public health and
technological advances that have aided in the fight against infectious
diseases in the United States.... In developing countries, clean water is
scarce; sewage systems are overwhelmed or nonexistent; the urban
metropolis is growing exponentially as the global market economy
expands and rural agricultural workers migrate to cities; and economic
need, political conflict, and wars are displacing millions of people and
creating growing refugee populations. 38
In developing countries, infectious diseases had not un-emerged. This context
provoked Paul Farmer to ask pointedly: "If certain populations have long been
afflicted by these disorders, why are the diseases considered 'new' or 'emerging'?
Is it simply because they have come to affect more visible-read, more 'valuable'
persons?"'' 39 The use of the term "emerging infectious diseases" reflects the driving
force behind the renaissance in interest in infectious diseases-the powerful again
felt vulnerable and threatened.
The return of the power paradigm does not, however, exactly mirror its earlier
form. As discussed earlier, the classical regime's rules demonstrated that the great
powers wanted to reduce their vulnerability to disease importation and the costs
national quarantine measures used by other countries created for international
trade. The emergence of the power paradigm in the 1990s and early 2000s also
contained growing fears about disease importation into developed nations through
the channels of international trade and travel.

138.
139.

MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, supra note 6, at 23.
FARMER, supra note 42, at 39.

2004 / Caught Between Paradiseand Power

Although discourse on emerging infectious diseases included discussion about
trade-restricting health measures, the return of the power paradigm did not focus as
heavily on the costs such measures imposed on the trade of developed nations. One
reason for this difference is that the kind of disruptive national quarantine measures
used routinely in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had disappeared
throughout the world. Thus, national quarantine practices no longer constituted the
kind of burden on trade they did in the earlier era. The lack of compliance with the
IHR's rules on trade- and travel-restricting health measures did not generally affect
the trade of developed countries, which were not countries that exported epidemic
diseases subject to the IHR.
The interests developed countries had in regulating trade-restricting health
measures shifted from the IHR to international trade law in the post-World War II
period, first under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and then under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) after its formation in 1995. '40 The Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations that produced the WTO also created a new
international trade agreement, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, which became, for developed countries, more important
for protecting trade from health-related restrictions than the IHR. 141
Trade-related concerns of the great powers factored into the return of the
power paradigm in a way different from the earlier development of this paradigm.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, infectious diseases overseas caused friction for the
trade interests of the great powers in the area of intellectual property rights rather
than the traditional trade-in-goods area. Heightened protection for intellectual
property rights, including patents, under the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)1 42 has caused enormous
controversy in global public health because of concerns that patent protection for
pharmaceuticals
will decrease access to essential medicines in developing
. ' 43
countries. Severe infectious disease problems in the developing world, especially
HIV/AIDS, contributed to a global campaign of developing-country governments
and non-governmental organizations to protect and clarify the public health
flexibilities and safeguards in TRIPS. This campaign forced the United States and
the European Union to retreat on their TRIPS positions and accept virtually all the
developing-country demands in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement

140. Fidler, supra note 52, at 286.
141. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IA-3.
142. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C.
143.

Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way

from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 29 (2002) ("The implementation of TRIPS ... is expected to impact
the possibility of obtaining new essential medicines at affordable prices.").

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 35

and Public Health, concluded in November 2001.'44 The TRIPS controversy within
the WTO again revealed the great powers having to manage friction in their trade
interests and relations caused by infectious diseases in developing countries and
regions.
The concerns about emerging infectious diseases also added a new feature to
the power paradigm not present in its prior incarnation. In the 1990s and early
2000s, many arguments were made that infectious disease problems in developing
45
countries represented a national security threat to developed states.1 Such
arguments were new because, prior to these assertions, "[h]ealth has rarely, if ever,
been defined as a national security issue."'" The infectious disease-national
security linkage arguments asserted that infectious diseases in developing
countries, particularly HIV/AIDS, could help undermine state capacity for good
governance and economic productivity.' 47 Declining state capacity contributes to
political instability nationally and regionally, creating indirect foreign policy and
national security problems for developed countries.' Thus, developed countries
in helping developing countries
have foreign policy and national security interests
149
problems.
disease
infectious
internal
their
tackle
At first glance, this line of argument seems to support the principle found in
the Preamble of the WHO Constitution, which provided: "Unequal development in
different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease, especially
communicable disease, is a common danger."' The assertion that HIV/AIDS in
sub-Saharan Africa represents a national security threat to the United States does
not, however, flow from the tenets of the paradise paradigm. The appeal in this
assertion does not promote the individual right to health, human solidarity through
health, or concepts of universal justice, but seeks to address a perceived threat from
infectious diseases to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The
argument links infectious disease problems in the developing world with the selfish

144. World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001). For an overview of the process leading to the Doha
Declaration, see 't Hoen, supranote 143, at 30-43.
145. The infectious disease-national security connection was, in the case of the United States,
crystallized in the Central Intelligence Agency's report on the implications of the global infectious disease
threat for the United States, which presented infectious diseases as a national security concern for the United
States. See National Intelligence Council, supra note 136.
146. CONTAGION AND CONFLICr, supra note 137, at vii.
147. See, e.g., PRICE-SMITH, supra note 37, at 121 (arguing that "infectious diseases may in fact
contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intra-state violence, and in extreme cases it
may accelerate state failure").
148. Id. at 122.
149. CISET REPORT, supra note 132, at 11 (Arguing that "the improvement of international health is a
valuable component of the U.S. effort to promote worldwide political stability through sustainable economic
development.... Thus, the effort to build a global surveillance and response system is in accord with the
national security and foreign policy goals of the United States.").
150. WHO Const., supra note 66, pmbl., at 2.

2004 / Caught Between Paradiseand Power
political calculations of the great powers rather than moving such problems
"beyond power" as the paradise paradigm attempts.
The frequency with which infectious disease problems in developing countries
were framed as foreign policy and national security concerns of the United States
and other powerful nations reveals, in many respects, just how far behind events
had left the paradise paradigm. First, arguments that epidemics in developing
countries of HIV/AIDS and other diseases threatened the foreign policy and
national security interests of the great powers were indicative of how bad the
infectious disease problem in the developing world had become. Instead of Health
for All by the Year 2000, the developing world was in the clutches of the worst
infectious disease epidemic in human history, HIV/AIDS, by the end of the
twentieth century. Faced with such a calamity, public health officials and political
leaders did not rush to re-embrace the vision in the Declaration of Alma-Ata. The
HIV/AIDS calamity, and other severe infectious disease problems, such as
tuberculosis and malaria, was not "beyond power," but desperately needed the
application of serious material power, which could only be supplied and exercised
by developed nations.
This dynamic explains why experts repeatedly framed infectious disease
problems in developing countries as threats to U.S. national security and foreign
policy rather than as evidence of the need for a rejuvenated Health for All strategy.
The paradise paradigm was not necessarily obliterated in this process because the
use of the power paradigm by some represented more a tactical than strategic move
in advancing global health. Efforts to use emerging infectious diseases to redefine
"security"' 5 illustrate that many involved in this issue wanted to appropriate
the
political appeal of "security" but transform it for ends more in tune with human
rights, health solidarity, and universal justice. Commentators chose, thus, to
analyze infectious diseases as threats to "human security," a reformulation of the
security concept that radically shifts the focus of security thinking from material
state power to threats to individual health and well-being. According to the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP):
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as
security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear
holocaust.... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people
who sought security in their daily lives.52

151. See, e.g., PRICE-SMITH, supra note 37, at 119 (using a non-traditional definition of security to
examine infectious disease threats); BROWER & CHALK, supra note 1,at 4-7 (adopting "human security" as a
framework through which to analyze infectious disease threats).
152.
(1994).

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at 22
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The UNDP maintained that human security involves protecting ordinary
people from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease, and repression, and from
sudden and harmful disruptions to the pattern of daily life.'53
The bottom line of arguments that redefine security is, however, clear and in
stark contrast to the paradise paradigm: Selfish incentives have to be constructed to
prompt increased great power concern and commitment to the problem of
infectious diseases, especially in developing countries. This bottom line appears in
other discourses developing in the 1990s and early 2000s on infectious disease
problems in the developing world. The famous Report of the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health asserted that developed countries should vastly
increase their financial assistance concerning developing-world health problems
because such problems significantly erode prospects for economic development in
T m The message the report sent is that infectious diseases in
developing countries.'
developing countries create macroeconomic trouble that will adversely affect
developed countries over time.'55 Thus, developed countries have a direct selfinterest in funding substantial improvements in the health conditions of the
developing world. Although this report supported the redistribution of resources
bears no
from rich to poor, the reasoning used in the report to reach this 5conclusion
6
paradigm.
paradise
the
informing
principles
the
to
resemblance
Another aspect of the efforts to jump start great power concern about
infectious diseases in the developing world offers a less subtle window on the
return of the power paradigm. The worsening of the infectious disease problem in
developing countries, highlighted by the havoc-wreaking HIV/AIDS pandemic,
has reached such a dismal point that the great powers simply could no longer
afford to ignore it. Continuing to appear indifferent or complacent about the
HIV/AIDS catastrophe threatened to complicate other foreign policy and national
security objectives the great powers had, especially the United States. The
deepening HIV/AIDS crisis complicated U.S. efforts to garner support for progress
in international trade liberalization (e.g., the TRIPS and access to essential
medicines controversy) and for the post-September 11 global war on terrorism.

153. Id. at 23. For the UNDP, human security serves as an umbrella concept for seven different kinds of
security needs: (1) freedom from poverty (economic security); (2) access to food (food security); (3) access to
health services and protection from disease (health security); (4) protection from environmental degradation
(environmental security); (5) protection against violent threats to personal safety (personal security); (6)
protection for indigenous cultures and ethnic communities (community security); and (7) protection of civil and
political rights and freedom from political oppression (political security). Id. at 24-25.
154. See COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH:
INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4 (2001) (recommending that high-income countries
"commit vastly increased financial assistance in the form of grants, especially to countries that need help most
urgently, which are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa").
155. Id. at 28 (Arguing that developed-country spending on health in poor countries is "an investment in
the well-being of the rich countries as well as the poor. The evidence is stark: disease breeds instability in poor
countries, which rebounds on the rich countries as well.").
156. The report mentions, for example, the "inclusion of health among the basic human rights enshrined
in international law," but does not return to the right to health at any point in its analysis. Id. at 21.

2004 / Caught Between Paradiseand Power
Resolving the crisis is not a U.S. strategic objective; but the horrific nature of the
problem, and developing-country anger and demands for assistance, put the United
States in the position of having to do something significant to reduce the friction
the issue was causing U.S. diplomacy on matters of central foreign policy and
national security concern."'
Even though the earlier formulation of the power paradigm did not include
extensive consideration of infectious disease problems inside poor, weak countries,
the incorporation of these problems into infectious disease diplomacy in the 1990s
and early 2000s still highlights the central features of the power paradigm:
Infectious diseases are framed as exogenous threats to the foreign policy interests
and national security of the great powers. The heightened risk of disease
importation by developed countries in the era of globalization represents a direct
exogenous threat that the literature on emerging infectious diseases repeatedly
emphasized. The negative consequences of disease-exacerbated political and
economic problems in developing countries constitute an indirect exogenous threat
infectious diseases pose for developed states. The policy advice urges the great
powers to reduce their vulnerability to the direct and indirect exogenous threats by
exercising their material power in ways that mitigate these threats.
D. Bioterrorism:A New Ally for the Power Paradigm
The development of the power paradigm in the first century of international
health diplomacy concerned only naturally occurring infectious diseases. It was not
concerned with the threat posed by the possible use of biological weapons. Such
weapons were a concern of international politics in the interwar period, as
evidenced by the extension of the ban on the first-use of chemical weapons to
biological weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 158 The concerns states had about
the use of biological weapons in warfare did not, however, affect the power
paradigm and its classical regime, which remained focused on naturally occurring
pathogenic threats. Further, in this time period, states expressed no concerns about
the use of biological weapons by terrorist groups. The public health concerns of the
power paradigm and the national security problems posed by biological weapons
never converged in the initial development of the power paradigm.
The power paradigm and national security worries about biological weapons
continued on divergent paths until the 1990s. Fears about state use of biological
weapons against the United States produced some public health activity after
World War II, contributing, for example, to the CDC's development of the
Epidemic Intelligence Service. 5 9 After this brief convergence of public health and

157. This dynamic may explain the five-year $15 billion Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief announced in
President Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2003. Bush, supra note 4.
158. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 44 L.N.T.S. 65.
159. Foege, supra note 73, at 18.
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national security, the threat of biological weapons faded as a concern of U.S. public
health authorities.'6° The biological weapons issue remained strictly an arms control
issue. The adoption of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
supplemented the 1925 Geneva Convention's ban on the first-use of biological
weapons with a prohibition on the development, production, acquisition, and
stockpiling of biological weapons by states.' 6
Public health and national security began to converge on biological weapons in
the 1990s as fears of biological weapons proliferation among states and terrorist
groups increased. Revelations about the scale of the former Soviet Union's
offensive biological weapons program and the extent of Iraqi efforts to develop a
biological weapons capability in the early 1990s raised the threat profile of
biological weapons as a national security concern. 6 2 The pursuit and terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan in the mid-1990s
turned the prospect of WMD terrorism from speculation to reality.6 6 The United
States, and other developed nations, faced the challenge of defending against and
preparing for bioterrorism. 64
The latter half of the 1990s saw the U.S. federal government begin to
formulate strategies for dealing with potential bioterrorist attacks. Experts argued
that the front-line of defense against bioterrorism was not the traditional firstresponders to emergencies, such as the police and firefighters.
The nation's

160. Id. (noting that, although the Epidemic Intelligence Service "program was conceived because of
concerns about biological warfare .... the major benefit of the program has been to improve the practice of
public health in this country").
161. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 309 (1972).
162. See R. P. Kadlec et al., Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implicationsfor the Future,
278 JAMA 351 (1997).
163. On Aum Shinrikyo, see David E. Kaplan, Aur Shinrikyo (1995), in TOXIC TERROR: ASSESSING
TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 207 (Jonathen B. Tucker ed., 2000).
164. David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and InternationalLaw, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 7, 9-10
(2002) ("The United States reacted to Aur Shinrikyo's chemical and attempted biological terrorism by
focusing on domestic preparedness for catastrophic terrorism.... At the federal level, the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 symbolized this policy shift toward preparedness for catastrophic
terrorism.").
165. Hearing on Terrorism Preparedness: Medical First Response, Before the House Comm. on
Government Reform, Subcommittee on NationalSecurity, Veteran Affairs, and InternationalRelations, Sept. 22,
1999, Testimony of Tara O'Toole, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/990922testimony_2.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); David L. Heymann,
Memorandum to the President:Emerging and Epidemic-Prone Diseases: Threats to Public Health Security, in
BIOLOGICAL SECURITY & PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 1, at 49, 51. With respect to the anthrax attacks in the
United States, the author comments that:
[d]iagnosis and treatment was done by first responder health workers, followed by a public
health response of the affected state by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).... Just as the health system was the first to detect cases and raise the alarm, it
remained at the front line throughout the public health response, alongside the criminal and
other elements of the response.
Id.
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public health system was the first line of defense, and the quality of that system
would determine how effectively the country could respond to a bioterrorist attack.
This perspective brought bioterrorism preparedness efforts and public health
efforts on emerging infectious diseases together. Experts identified synergies
between preparing for both types of pathogenic threats. For example, improved
infectious disease surveillance in the United States for naturally occurring diseases
would benefit efforts to defend against bioterrorist attacks.'6 6 Similarly, money
devoted to strengthening the nation's defenses against bioterrorism would also help
the country deal with the growing threat of naturally occurring infectious diseases.
The rise of policy concern with bioterrorism in the 1990s and early 2000s
occurs simultaneously with the return of the power paradigm in connection with
infectious diseases, and bioterrorism significantly affects the conceptualization of
pathogenic threats in the 1990s and early 2000s.' 67 The nature of the bioterrorist
threat powerfully reinforced the power paradigm's view of infectious diseases as
exogenous threats to a nation's interests, security, and power. Bioterrorism
encouraged policy responses that sought to reduce the state's vulnerability to
exogenous pathogenic threats. The intense focus on national bioterrorism
preparedness strategies helped subordinate foreign policy and national security
concerns about infectious disease problems in developing countries, especially
after the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001.
Bioterrorism preparedness did not ignore international public health
cooperation,' 68 but the focus on bioterrorism helped shape such cooperation in ways
that resonate with the power paradigm. For example, experts argued that improved
global infectious disease surveillance was important for U.S. defenses against
bioterrorist attacks.' 69 Thus, the United States should support WHO efforts to
strengthen global disease surveillance as part of protecting U.S. national security
from bioterrorist attack. These policy arguments connected with the concerns of
U.S. vulnerability to imported infectious diseases to produce strong U.S. national

166. Heymann, supra note 165, at 54 (arguing that "there must be increased understanding by the U.S.
Congress and the governments of other countries that strengthening public health for naturally occurring
infectious diseases will ensure detection and response to those that may be deliberately caused...").
167. Id. at 50 (arguing that, after the anthrax attacks in the United States, "preparedness for a possible
bioterrorist attack has become one of the highest profile security issues pertaining to infectious diseases and
international public health security").
168. The United States and other countries created, for example, the Ottawa Plan to improve
international cooperation on bioterrorism preparedness. See Fidler, supra note 164, at 17. Under the Ottawa
Plan, "the strengthening of global capacity for infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response is an
essential component of preparedness for a possible attack using biological weapons." Heymann, supra note 165,
at 50.
169. Foege, supra note 73, at 22.
Protection of the United States requires increased cooperation with, and support for,
WHO.... The United States could improve global health security while improving national
health security by providing people and resources to the World Health Organization to assist
in their development of an optimal system of gathering pertinent health information from the
entire world.
Id.
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interests in improving global disease surveillance capabilities. This policy direction
conceptualizes infectious diseases, both naturally occurring and intentionally
caused, as exogenous threats to the interests, security, and power of sovereign
states, including the world's hegemon.
The impact of the bioterrorism problem on conceptualizing pathogenic threats
can be seen in WHO activities. The policy convergence generated for public health
by emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism gave WHO (as well as national
public health agencies) the opportunity to appropriate the concept of "security" in
its infectious disease activities. The effort to revise the IHR in the 1990s and early
2000s became, thus, part of WHO's strategy to improve "global health security."' 70
WHO interpreted this concept broadly, in part to support those who argued that
"security" needed to have an expanded definition and to be moved away from its
traditional narrow focus on the material power and interests of the state.' 7,
"Security" means freedom from risk or danger. Health security means,
therefore, freedom from risks and dangers to health. Global health security means
freedom from risks and dangers to health arising from global interactions among
peoples and states. The global health security concept also sends the message that a
nation's health security is intertwined with the rest of the world through the
processes of globalization. 7 A country that wants to reduce its vulnerability to
infectious disease risks and dangers must participate in global endeavors to reduce
infectious disease problems.
The logic of the global health security concept interfaces directly into the
premises of the power paradigm. The power paradigm's conceptualization of
pathogenic threats flows from awareness of the state's vulnerability to infectious
disease risks and dangers. Addressing such vulnerability requires cooperation
among states and the building of regimes to regulate international cooperation on
infectious disease control. The power paradigm produced, for example, the
classical regime.
Even with its broad focus, WHO's "global health security" constitutes a
conceptualization of infectious disease threats that is different from the vision
contained in Preamble of the WHO Constitution and the Declaration of Alma-Ata.
The Preamble of the WHO Constitution provided that "[u]nequal development
in different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease, especially
communicable disease, is a common danger."' ' The premises of the paradise
paradigm held that the common danger should be primarily reduced by dealing
170. Global Health Security, 76 WEEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RECORD 166 (2001); WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL DEFENSE AGAINST THE INFECIOUS DISEASE THREAT 12-19 (2003) (discussing
global health security).
171. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 170, at 14 (arguing that traditional conceptions of
security have been altered by the end of the Cold War and the forces of globalization).
172. Id. at 15 (arguing that "the resurgence of the infectious disease threat has global causes and
consequences that can only be addressed through global solutions supported by strong national public health
capacity").
173. WHO Const., supra note 66, prnbl., at 2.
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with the underlying inequality of health conditions that individuals face within and
among countries by a redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The global
health security concept subordinates this objective to strategies aimed at reducing
national vulnerabilities of states to exogenous pathogenic threats, namely improved
global disease surveillance and outbreak response and the restoration of national
public health capabilities.
The impact of bioterrorism on the power paradigm sharpened the focus on
national vulnerabilities and the construction of approaches to reduce exogenous
threats to them. In addition, the direct threat bioterrorism presented to states further
marginalized the belief that redistributive justice would remove indirect dangers
from pathogenic problems in poor countries. Bioterrorism was about power, and
preparedness for this threat could not rely on strategies concocted to take public
health "beyond power" into a post-historical world where human rights, health
solidarity, and universal justice prevailed. The Health for All vision simply lacked
credibility as a basis for policy in the face of the threat of bioterrorism.
The rise of the bioterrorism problem contributed, thus, to the return of the
power paradigm in two fundamental ways. First, bioterrorism reinforced the power
paradigm's conceptualization of infectious diseases as exogenous threats to a
state's interests, security, and power. The synergy between policy responses to
emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism preparedness was a synergy based
on reducing national vulnerabilities to pathogenic threats. In terms of naturally
occurring infectious diseases, the synergy is focused on potential direct threats such
as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or pandemic influenza rather than
indirect threats posed by HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.
Second, the policy attention and funding concentrated on bioterrorism,
especially in the United States, channeled the power paradigm's return more
forcefully toward bioterrorism preparedness than addressing threats from naturally
occurring infectious diseases. This new policy climate makes efforts to address
health inequalities between developed and developing nations politically and
financially more difficult, which echoes the lack of interest the initial development
of the power paradigm showed for infectious disease problems inside weaker states
in the international system.
V. CAUGHT BETWEEN PARADISE AND POWER: THE CHALLENGE
OF THE AxIs OF ILLNESS

A.

Navigating the Space Between

The paradise and power "shifts" analyzed in Parts IM and IV outline two
distinct ways of conceptualizing pathogenic threats to national and international
public health. The power and paradise paradigms share little, if any, common
ground, making conceptual melding of these two perspectives difficult. In my work
on global public health, I sense both reluctant acceptance that power politics has
returned to public health and a desire not to allow the return of power to obliterate
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the ideals of the Preamble of the WHO Constitution and the Declaration of AlmaAta. This situation encourages people to explore the space between power and
paradise in order to construct ways to advance both aspects of the world politics of
public health.
Attempts to navigate the space between the power and paradise paradigms
come in different forms, and three prominent arguments involve: (1) the attempt to
redefine "security" in order to advance a strategy for addressing pathogenic
threats; 7 4 (2) the effort to make pathogenic threats problems of macroeconomic
importance; 7 ' and (3) the appeal to the developed nations to exercise "soft power"
leadership in helping the developing world address its mounting infectious disease
problems. 116These arguments attempt primarily to address the problem of naturally
occurring infectious diseases rather than bioterrorism, which has become firmly
planted in traditional national security frameworks. Each argument seeks the same
objective--constructing incentives for the great powers to exercise their power in
ways that will improve the deteriorating infectious disease situation in the
developing world. Navigating the space between the power and paradise paradigms
appears, thus, to resemble an attempt to salvage some paradise through the
enlightened application of power.
This context brings my analysis back to Kagan's exploration of U.S. and
European world views. Kagan chastises growing European hostility toward
American power by arguing that Europe's move "beyond power into a self77
contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation"'
is only possible because of American power and the willingness of the United
States to use it.178 During the Cold War, the power of the United States shielded
Europe from the Soviet military and political threat; and the Europeans used the
space created by the American shield to rebuild their relations with each other
through the institutions and processes that eventually became the European Union.
According to Kagan, Europe's "post-historical paradise of peace and relative
prosperity" is built on the foundation of U.S. power, not in opposition to it or as a
viable competitor of it.'79 The European paradise represents weakness encased in
the hard shell of American military, political, and economic power. Europeans are,
thus, caught in the political space between paradise and power.

174. See, e.g., BROWER & CHALK, supra note 1,at 1-12 (using the human security concept to analyze
public health and U.S. national security); PRICE-SMITH, supra note 37, at 119 (rejecting traditional notions of
security in analyzing infectious disease threats); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 170, at 14
(arguing that traditional notions of security are breaking down and broadening to include threats such as those
posed by infectious diseases).
175. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH (1993); COMMISSION
ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, supra note 154.

176. Kickbusch, supra note 39, at 138 (urging the United States to develop soft power leadership on
global health).
177. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 3.
178. Id. at 72.
179. Id. at 72-73.
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Kagan's insight into European and American world views also has relevance
for the efforts being made to navigate between the power and paradise paradigms
on pathogenic threats. Each of the three main navigational strategies mentioned
above seeks to achieve some of the goals within the paradise paradigm through
motivating the great powers to see the infectious disease crisis in the developing
world as of direct importance to their security, economic, and political interests.
The prospects for the vision contained in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution
and Declaration of Alma-Ata depend on the effective exercise of power by strong
states.
Reinforcing this view is the nature of the threat naturally occurring infectious
diseases present. The next section explores the complex policy challenges that
emerging infectious diseases pose. The nature of the threat not only reinforces the
need for strong states to exercise their power more energetically but also suggests
why public health may remain stuck between the paradise and power paradigms for
the foreseeable future.
B. The Axis of Illness: Defining the Policy Challenges of Emerging Infectious
Diseases
The United States has placed the threat of bioterrorism within a larger strategic
framework of U.S. national security that President George W. Bush famously
called the "axis of evil." ' 8 Leaving the choice of rhetoric aside, the axis of evil
identifies the key national security threats the United States faces in the postSeptember 11 era. Those threats are repressive regimes, weapons of mass
destruction, and international terrorism (Figure 2). As articulated by President
Bush, these threats are interdependent, combining to create the axis that poses
dangers for U.S. national security. The axis of evil is, in fact, a strategic doctrine,
like the Truman Doctrine, that provides a roadmap for the exercise of U.S. power.

180. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/0l/20020129-Ii.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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FIGURE 2. THE AXIS OF EVIL
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The axis of evil doctrine has helped plant deterrence of, and defense against,
bioterrorism firmly within the U.S. strategies of both national and homeland
security."' The importance of the nation's public health infrastructure and
capabilities to bioterrorism preparedness has elevated public health into the realms
of national and homeland security, a position public health has never occupied
before. Although historically unprecedented for public health, the incorporation of
public health in U.S. national and homeland security does not represent a
conceptual sea change for U.S. perceptions of its national security. The elevation of
public health into the traditional conception of national security means that U.S.
national security experts see public health as another material capability to be
marshaled to protect the United States from external threats. Bringing public health
into the existing world of national security has not broadened the way in which the
United States conceptualizes national security threats.
Bioterrorism preparedness has, thus, benefited from having a strategic doctrine
on U.S. national security to guide the application of U.S. power. The problem of
emerging infectious diseases does not, however, fit into the axis of evil, nor does it
appear to have stimulated the development of any particular doctrine to guide the
application of U.S. power against naturally occurring pathogenic threats. The
closest things to such a doctrine are the arguments that naturally occurring
infectious diseases represent direct (e.g., disease importation) and indirect (e.g.,
contributing to state failure abroad) exogenous threats to U.S. foreign policy and
national security interests.

181.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 6-7;

OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 1, at 43.
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These arguments lack the clarity of a strategic doctrine, such as that provided
by the axis of evil. The axis of evil doctrine clearly identifies the targets for the
application of U.S. power internationally: containing (or even overthrowing)
repressive regimes, deterring the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by state
and non-state actors, and fighting international terrorism. The problem with
emerging infectious diseases is that the nature of the threat is not easily described
because the problem is incredibly complex. In the following paragraphs, I construct
the "axis of illness" as an attempt to simplify the complexity represented by
infectious disease emergence and re-emergence. Constructing the axis of illness
helps communicate why appeals to the great powers to exercise their strength more
energetically in the public health area may have less policy traction than advocates
for more great power leadership might hope.
A common feature of literature on emerging infectious diseases is the listing of
the many different factors that contribute to pathogen emergence and reemergence. Looking at two reports on emerging microbial threats from the Institute
of Medicine illustrates this phenomenon. The seminal 1992 report on emerging
microbial threats to the United States listed six factors in disease emergence:
human demographics and behavior; technology and industry; economic
development and land use; international travel and commerce; microbial adaptation
and change; and breakdown of public health measures.1 2 Identifying such factors
helps communicate the message that infectious disease emergence and reemergence is an interdependent relationship between the microbe, host, and the
environment in which they interact (Figure 3).
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The Institute of Medicine report on microbial threats published in 2003
expands the factors contributing to infectious disease emergence from six to
thirteen (Figure 4),183 which again illustrates the enormous complexity of the
phenomenon of disease emergence and spread. The Institute of Medicine's 2003
report sees infectious disease emergence arising from the convergence of genetic
and biological factors; physical environmental factors; ecological factors; and
social, political, and economic factors.' 84 The convergence of these interlocking
factors determines the nature of the interaction between the human and the
microbe.
FIGURE 4. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE'S REVISED LIST OF FACTORS BEHIND
INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCE AND RE-EMERGENCE

" Microbial adaptation and change
" Human susceptibility to infection
" Climate and weather
" Changing ecosystems
" Human demographics and
behavior
" Economic development and
land use

" International trade and travel
" Technology and industry
" Breakdown of public health
system
" Poverty and social inequality
* Warand famine
" Lack of political will
" Intent to harm

The number and variety of factors contributing to emerging infectious
diseases make organizing policy responses for this problem nightmarish. The
axis of illness represents one way to organize these factors into categories in
order to highlight major areas for possible policy interventions. Table 1 slots the
factors identified in the latest Institute of Medicine report on microbial threats
into five categories.

183. MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, supra note 6, at 53-147.
184. Id. at 53.
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TABLE I. FACTORS OF EMERGENCE IN FIVE CATEGORIES

Category
Microbial resilience
Human mobility
Social determinants
of health
Globalization

Collective action
problems

Factors from Institute of Medicine (2003)
Microbial adaptation and change; human susceptibility
to infection
International trade and travel; human demographics
and behavior; technology and industry
Poverty and social inequalities; war and famine;
climate and weather; human demographics and
behavior; technology and industry
Economic development and land use; technology and
industry; changing ecosystems; human demographics
and behavior
Lack of political will; intent to harm; breakdown of
public health measures; poverty and social
inequalities; war and famine

The category of "microbial resilience" captures the importance of microbial,
genetic, and biological factors that drive pathogenic evolution and its relationship
to humans. The Institute of Medicine stressed, for example, the importance of
microbial adaptation and change to infectious disease emergence:
Microbes are continually undergoing adaptive evolution under selective
pressures for perpetuation. Through structural and functional genetic
changes, they can bypass the human immune system and infect human
cells. The tremendous evolutionary potential of microbes makes them
adept at developing resistance to even the most potent drug therapies and
complicates attempts at creating effective vaccines.'85
"Human mobility" emphasizes the roles international trade, travel, and
migration play in disease emergence, including the contributions technology and
industry make in increasing the speed, scope, and impact of human mobility. The
category of "social determinants of health" focuses attention on the underlying
societal problems that foster microbial penetration of human populations. Social
determinants of health face constant pressure from the other elements of the axis of
illness and are adversely affected by factors, such as the breakdown of public
health capabilities, that undercut the ability to protect and promote public health.
"Globalization" refers to factors that accelerate economic development,
technology, industry, and culture in ways that deterritorialize human behavior and
the environmental milieu in which humans and microbes interact. The category of
185.
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"collective action problems" refers to the governance challenges created by
infectious disease emergence that human societies confront at national,
international, and global levels. When the Institute of Medicine identifies the
breakdown in public health measures as a risk factor in disease emergence and reemergence, l"6 it focuses attention on government and governance failures on public
health. Responding to resurgent infectious disease requires successful collective
action both within and among states.
The axis of illness forms as these five categories interact to foster the
emergence and spread of infectious diseases (Figure 5). It is important to stress that
each category connects with the others directly and indirectly in a dynamic process.
For example, the processes of globalization directly affect human mobility by
making faster transportation technologies available. Globalization affects collective
action problems by exacerbating problems with social determinants of health and
accelerating human mobility. Of most relevance for my purposes is how the axis of
illness highlights the daunting governance challenges the emergence and reemergence of infectious diseases present. Resolution of collective action problems
is very difficult because governance strategies have to bear, in some sustainable
fashion, the constant forces produced by the interdependence of microbial
resilience, human mobility, social determinants of health, and globalization.

FIGURE 5. THE AXIS OF ILLNESS
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The axis of illness represents the policy context that has to be kept in mind
when analyzing calls for the great powers to show more leadership on global public
health issues, especially in connection with improving health conditions in
developing countries. The return of the power paradigm, and the appeals to its
fundamental dynamics, stress enlightened self-interest of the great powers as the
path of global health progress. One potential use of the axis of illness is to keep
policy analysis of emerging infectious diseases from falling into the trap of myopia
and parochialism. The axis of illness highlights the complex, globalized web of
interdependent factors that strong countries, such as the United States, have to
appreciate in responding appropriately to naturally occurring pathogenic threats.
This use of the axis of illness resonates with Kickbusch's argument that what is
needed to move the United States into more robust leadership in global health is a
broadly conceived public debate and dialogue "on how the United States as a
whole-its government, its private sector, its NGOs and foundations, its academic
institutions, and its citizens-contributes to and is affected by the global
distribution of health and disease.'.. Kickbusch's underlying objective in fostering
such a dialogue is the redefinition of U.S. national interests in connection with
global public health: "It is not helpful to give a long list of 'shoulds,' ranging from
financial ' contributions
to world agreements, when what is needed is a change in
mindset." ' 8
The axis of illness may, however, have exactly the opposite effect on the
United States and other great powers. The power paradigm is premised on
responding to exogenous pathogenic threats to a country's national interests,
security, and power. New forms of political, security, economic, and power
rationales for great-power engagement in global public health appeal directly to the
self-interested dynamic of the power paradigm. Confronted with the tangled web of
the axis of illness, a great power may well scrutinize very carefully exactly where
its interests, security, and power are threatened, how they are threatened, and what
realistically it can do about such threats. The results of such great power
machinations over the axis of illness may not be policies desired by those seeking
to prod the great powers toward "enlightened self-interest." The results may mirror
the dynamic that unfolded in the first century of international health diplomacy:
The great powers (1) engaged in self-help by improving their national defenses
against pathogenic threats through improved national public health capabilities and
the development of antimicrobial technologies; and (2) led international
cooperative efforts to (a) reduce their vulnerability to disease importation through
improved disease surveillance, and (b) mitigate the burdens infectious diseases
created for other foreign policy objectives, such as promoting international trade.
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The axis of illness may well teach a great power that the seriousness and
complexity of pathogenic threats in the early twenty-first century require, first and
foremost, a determined effort to rebuild national defenses against disease
importation. The traditional national security framework's focus on bioterrorism
preparedness supports such a strong national effort. A rebuilding strategy would
involve strengthening (1) domestic public health capabilities to improve responses
to disease importation and onward transmission; and (2) international surveillance
mechanisms that provide national public health systems with early warning about
potential exogenous microbial threats. These policy reform ideas mirror what the
great powers did in the first century of international health activity. First, the great
powers initiated domestic public health reforms to reduce their national
vulnerability to disease importation. Second, they led the effort to establish a
system of international surveillance for exogenous disease threats of concern to
them in the form of the classical regime.
The axis of illness may also teach the great powers that infectious disease
problems in other countries are more likely to complicate the achievement of other
foreign policy objectives in the twenty-first century. In the latter half of the
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, the major foreign policy
objective complicated by infectious diseases was international trade. The great
powers learned in the nineteenth century that neglecting the uncoordinated
application of national quarantine systems burdened their efforts to expand the
scope and profitability of their trading systems. Today, neglecting the serious
problems other countries experience from infectious diseases may burden a broader
range of foreign policy interests, including promoting trade, protecting intellectual
property rights, fostering economic development in the developing world, fighting
international terrorism, and maintaining stability in strategic countries and regions
of the world (e.g., China and Russia).
This broad potential impact of emerging infectious diseases on the interests of
the great powers is one reason why advocates of improved global public health are
making appeals that resonate with the power paradigm. This broadness calls for
heightened foreign policy scrutiny of claims that emerging infectious diseases are
significant problems standing in the way of the great powers achieving other goals.
As analyzed earlier, the catastrophe of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and other
parts of the developing world has indeed become an obstacle to U.S. foreign policy
in advancing U.S. interests in more trade liberalization within the WTO. 18 9
Developing countries, supported by non-governmental organizations, have forced
the United States and the European Union to retreat on the issue of compulsory
licensing and parallel importing of patented pharmaceutical products with the
context of TRIPS.'9o The great powers retreated largely to reduce the potential of
the access to medicines controversy to scupper progress in other areas of trade
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liberalization and complicate foreign policy on other issues of strategic importance
to the great powers, such as enhanced cooperation on counter-terrorism.
Claims are often made that the HIV/AIDS problem in sub-Saharan Africa and
elsewhere represents a threat to U.S. national security because HIV/AIDS threatens
to contribute to state failure, which can lead to problems of national security
concern for the United States.' 9' As the Taliban's harboring of Al Qaeda
demonstrated, failed states can be very dangerous to the great powers;' 92 so the
linkage between HIV/AIDS-related devastation and potential state failure is
sufficient to focus foreign policy and national security attention on this argument.
The linkage begins to look weak, premature, or merely hypothetical when one
realizes that infectious diseases played no material role in foreign policy and
national security headaches caused by failed states, such as Somalia, Afghanistan,
Rwanda, the Congo, and Liberia.
Great power scrutiny of the linkage between infectious diseases and state
failure may also lead analysis away from parts of the developing world that are
most heavily affected by pathogenic threats. As I have argued elsewhere, 93 the
argument that HIV/AIDS can destabilize countries and threaten U.S. foreign policy
and national security interests appears to have more resonance when the countries
in question are of strategic concern to the great powers-countries such as China,
Russia, and India.' 94 The concern with countries of strategic importance
marginalizes the region of the world most significantly affected by HIV/AIDS,
sub-Saharan Africa. Eberstadt explains why this marginalization occurs within the
traditional approach to national security and foreign policy:
Africa's AIDS catastrophe is a humanitarian disaster of world historic
proportions, yet the economic and political reverberations from this crisis
have been remarkably muted outside the continent itself. The explanation
for this awful dissonance lies in the region's marginal status in global
economics and politics. By many measures, for example, sub-Saharan
Africa's contribution to the world economy is less than Switzerland's. In
military affairs, no regional state, save perhaps South Africa, has the
capacity to conduct overseas combat operations, and indeed sub-Saharan
governments are primarily preoccupied with local troubles. The states of
the region are thus not well positioned to influence events much beyond
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Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 787 (2003).
194. See, e.g., Eberstadt, supra note 137, at 22-23 (emphasizing Russia, China, and India's problems
with HIV/AIDS over sub-Saharan Africa's); National Intelligence Council, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS:
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China (Intelligence Community Assessment 2002-04D, Sept. 2002),
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their own borders under any circumstances, good or ill-and the cruel
consequence is that the world pays them little attention.' 9
More broadly, Helen Epstein reinforces the point made by Eberstadt by
arguing that
[t]he reason the health crisis in developing countries is so serious is
precisely because it is possible for rich nations to prosper even with
billions of sick and hungry people in the world. So for Western countries,
the health crisis in developing countries is really not an economic question,
or even a security question. It is a moral question, however unfashionable
that may be, and this is what makes it so hard to deal with.'9
The axis of illness concept can also be used to question the linkage between
infectious diseases and state failure in another way. Is state failure a result of
pathogenic threats, or are the pathogenic threats a result of state failure caused by
other factors? In other words, if a great power identified a link between state failure
and infectious diseases, the appropriate policy response might not be to improve
public health capabilities in the state in question as a first priority. The appropriate
response might be to target macro-level governance problems that cause or
exacerbate pathogenic destabilization of the country. Great powers are typically not
willing to dole out assistance, including for infectious disease programs, to
governments that have proven themselves incapable of using the assistance
effectively. Structural adjustment or even regime change may very well be in order
as opposed to increased foreign assistance for public health.
The complexity highlighted by the axis of illness may also have the curious
effect of limiting the interest of the great powers in emerging infectious diseases
rather than enlightening it. Today's great powers have deep political and economic
interests in advancing globalization and the human mobility it fosters, so they have
little interest in constricting these contributors to the axis of illness. Great powers
have the ability and resources to resolve domestic collective action problems that
arise in connection with pathogenic threats,' 97 even if they have neglected public
health for decades and now face greater threats from infectious diseases.'98
International collective action problems pose more of a dilemma for the great
powers for two basic reasons. First, solutions to international collective action
problems are notoriously difficult to create and sustain, even in contexts much
195. Eberstadt, supra note 137, at 23.
196. Helen Epstein, The Global Health Crisis, in BIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra
note 1, at 9, 15.
197. BROWER & CHALK, supra note 1, at xv (arguing that "[c]urrently the United States is managing the
infectious disease threat...").
198. Id. at xv-xvi (arguing that "[als Americans' exposure to emerging and reemerging pathogens has
grown, the country's ability to respond to infectious disease has diminished in many areas" because "of the low
priority given to public health over the past 30 years").
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more focused than the axis of illness, because of the context of anarchy in which
states interact.
Second, international collective action on public health confronts a daunting
deterioration in social determinants of health in many countries, including
overpopulation, poverty, malnutrition, environmental degradation, and inequitable
access to economic and health resources. Comprehensively addressing crises in
social determinants of health in an anarchical system of independent sovereign
states is something even the most enlightened great powers would hesitate to
tackle. The difficulties of this task may encourage the great powers to concentrate
even more intently on what is much more within the realm of possibility:
strengthening national public health defenses and targeting limited strategies for
improved international cooperation on infectious diseases, such as global
surveillance.
The paradise paradigm wanted states to confront the root causes of global
public health problems, and the paradigm called for the termination of the dynamic
in which the great powers determined international health policy. The great powers
are not likely to embrace a program of action that declares their special status in
international health matters illegitimate. Further, the great powers have had
sufficient experience with foreign assistance and international aid to be skeptical
that calls for massive redistribution of resources for public health purposes would
best serve their foreign policy and national security interests.
In summary, the axis of illness might very well encourage the great powers to
hew closely to the power paradigm: Strengthen national defenses against disease
importation; construct international mechanisms, especially international
surveillance, that will aid the effective functioning of such national defenses; and
mitigate the drag infectious disease problems in developing countries create for the
achievement of other foreign policy and national security objectives through, for
example, modest support for, and funding of, global health initiatives.
This response to the axis of illness resonates with the incorporation of public
health into national security thinking prompted by the axis of evil. As discussed
above, bioterrorism preparedness in the United States focuses on two goals: (1)
improving domestic public health capabilities against intentionally caused disease
outbreaks; and (2) supporting international cooperative endeavors, such as global
surveillance, that interface with stronger national-level public health response
capacities. Bioterrorism defense policy would also support modest international
assistance on public health problems around the world because it might contribute
to the willingness of other governments to join the United States in fighting the
dangerous link between weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.
The axes of evil and illness combine to create policy rationales closely aligned to
the premises of the power paradigm.
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C. ParadiseBacklash: Rejecting the Hegemony of the Power Paradigm
The return of the power paradigm in conceptualizing pathogenic threats,
reinforced by the policy prescriptions of bioterrorism preparedness, has given this
paradigm near hegemonic status in thinking about global infectious disease
problems. This development has not escaped the attention of critics who find the
return of the power paradigm unacceptable as a basis for addressing global disease
issues. One of the most passionate and eloquent critics is Paul Farmer, a doctor and
anthropologist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School. Farmer blasts what he
calls "the self-serving relativism of the public health realpolitik,"'99 an approach to
infectious diseases that favors the powerful and disadvantages the poor and
vulnerable. He condemns public health realpolitik by citing the provision in the
Preamble of the WHO Constitution that provides: "Unequal development in
different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease, especially
communicable disease, is a common danger."20 In a statement that qualifies as a
succinct critique of the return of the power paradigm, Farmer argued:
in a wealthy country, the specter of biological warfare, for which there is
exceedingly slender evidence, triggers a sort of officially blessed paranoia.
In a poor country tightly bound to the rich one, real infections continue to
kill the poor .... At best, those of us working in places like Haiti can hope
for trickle-down funds if the plagues of the poor are classed as "U.S.
security interests."' '
For Farmer, the estimated six million deaths annually attributable to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria-"three treatable diseases that reap their
grim harvest almost exclusively among populations without access to modern
medical care" 2 -reflect what he calls "structural violence" perpetrated by the rich
and powerful against the poor and weak.2 3

Farmer's alternative agenda strikes chords sounded in the Preamble of the
WHO Constitution and the Declaration of Alma-Ata. To begin, he argues that an
agenda focused on "health and human rights" should replace public health
realpolitik.2°4 Such a focus connects to the paradise paradigm's emphasis on health
as a fundamental human right." Farmer's "new agenda for health and human
rights" includes other themes from the paradise paradigm, including notions of
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human solidarity, equity in access to health services and health outcomes, and
redistribution of resources from rich to poor.206
The prominence of Farmer's writings demonstrates that the paradise paradigm
still lives in the global public health community. The guardians of the paradigm's
vision appear largely to be non-state actors, such as non-governmental
organizations, that have taken up the challenge of promoting the right to health,
health equity across and within borders, and redistributive health justice.
Kickbusch observed, for example, that "NGOs exert increasing influence on the
global health agenda, and their main points of reference are human rights and
ethics, the global health gap, and health as a component and expression of global
citizenship."2°7 Farmer encourages this dynamic by arguing that "[w]e need to be
untrammeled by obligations to powerful states and international bureaucracies."2t1 8
Promoting global civil society actors as the engine of progressive change in the
world politics of public health parallels critical agendas developed in other
domains of international relations, including the area of human rights.
The emphasis on non-governmental organizations and other like-minded nonstate actors represents a change in the paradise paradigm from its halcyon days
after World War II. The Preamble of the WHO Constitution and the Declaration of
Alma-Ata are instruments adopted by states to guide health policies within and
among countries. Farmer calls attention to the emptiness of such solemn charters
and documents, arguing that the victims of structural violence do not require more
idealistic pronunciations from cynical states and compromised international
organizations, but need "pragmatic solidarity" built through networks of non-state
actors pooling their efforts to alleviate the health suffering of the poor and
vulnerable.2°9
Farmer's passionate vision for overcoming public health realpolitik is
impressive but also leaves one uncertain how, from a context in which the power
paradigm prevails, global civil society moves the world politics of public health
back in the direction outlined in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution and the
Declaration of Alma-Ata. As analyzed earlier, the paradise paradigm prevailed in
international health policy when powerful countries lost interest in international
health cooperation. As Kickbusch argued, the task facing global public health
today is simply too large to leave to networks of non-governmental organizations
and well-meaning philanthropists.2 ° What seems to be required is not public health
realpolitik but realpolitik for public health. This transformation requires that the
great powers have sufficient incentives to exercise their power for, rather than
against, global public health. This logic explains why so many efforts have been
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made to convince the great powers that emerging infectious diseases affect their
fundamental foreign policy and national security interests.
As Kagan's analysis of U.S. and European world views argues, there is no
paradise without power. Kagan believes the Europeans mistakenly project their
"paradise" onto the behavior of the United States and wonder why the Americans
do not act more like Europeans. The Europeans forget that their paradise would not
exist but for American power. The backlash against the contemporary hegemony of
the power paradigm voiced by Farmer and shared by others does not provide a
means for public health to escape the conundrum of being caught, like the
Europeans, between paradise and power. In the context of public health, Farmer's
global civil society movements are the "Europeans," projecting a vision of health
for all that cannot exist without supportive intervention by the "Americans," the
great powers.
VI. CONCLUSION: GIVING POWER MEANING THROUGH HEALTH

The friction between the paradise and power paradigms at the heart of this
article's analysis resembles, in many ways, similar tensions in the fields of
international law and international relations. Martti Koskenniemi identified, for
example, a dynamic involving "apologia" and "utopia" in international law. 21 ' A
debate between "idealism" and "realism" has marked the study of international
relations. 212 Stanley Hoffmann argued that the field of international relations
contains a permanent dialogue between the pessimistic realist Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and the perpetual peacenik Immanuel Kant. 2 3 Public health's
predicament of being caught between paradise and power simply represents a
different version of an age-old political discourse between the practical exigencies
of the present and normative aspirations for the future.
Part of the revolution that public health has experienced in the last decade is
the importance of this age-old discourse to global health activities. Public health as
an issue in international relations has always involved politics and has always been
a political endeavor, but international public health has historically been relegated
to the obscurity of "low politics" and "mere humanitarianism." The waxing of the
paradise paradigm and the waning of the power paradigm in the post-World War H
period did not generate a global public health version of Rousseau and Kant's
permanent dialogue, at a difficult time when other pressing issues of international
relations entered this dialogic space. The return of the power paradigm in its
contemporary form has elevated public health from being just a humanitarian issue
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and has triggered a debate about reconciling the need for the exercise of real power
and the ideals of health for all.
Idealism/realism debates in international law and international relations
sometimes pit material power against intangible values, as if the two have no
common ground. But another aspect of these debates is the attempt to give power
normative meaning. A common strategy in this regard was the "harmony of
interests" doctrine-what was in the national interests of one state was also in the
interests of others. 1 4 Realists argued that the "harmony of interests" doctrine was
merely a way for strong states to maintain their advantages in power and influence
and to deny legitimacy to the claims of weaker states for change." 5 At times,
arguments linking infectious diseases and U.S. national security and foreign policy
constitute little more than "harmony of interests" thinking,216 the harmony of which
disguises serious differences in interests. 217
Giving power normative meaning beyond the shallow "harmony of interests"
is critical to navigating the shoals of the idealism/realism conflict. The discipline of
international relations theory contains a number of competing theories, including
institutionalism, liberalism, Marxism, critical theory, and social constructivism,
each of which provides a normative alternative to realism's bleak perspective on
international politics. Historically, health has not factored as an issue in these grand
theoretical debates about power and purpose in world politics because it has either
been ignored or treated as matter of "low politics" or, at best, "soft power."
The predicament of being caught between paradise and power confronts public
health with a challenge to bridge two radically different ways to conceptualize
pathogenic threats and other risks to health. The power paradigm conceives of
health in terms of power. The paradise paradigm thinks of power in terms of
health. Whether those two conceptions can be reconciled in an environment where
global public health is deeply dependent on exogenous disease threats to, and the
material capabilities of, the great powers, especially the United States, remains
unclear. The impact on the power paradigm of the threat of bioterrorism, which
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predominantly concerns the great powers, exacerbates the difficulty of the
reconciliation task.
Kagan ends his analysis of the divergence in U.S. and European world views by
arguing that European weakness actually gives U.S. power normative meaning that
binds the United States and Europe together. The exercise of U.S. power has helped
produce the new Europe, "a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebrationon both sides of the Atlantic."2 '8 Kagan's argument touches something much deeper
than a superficial "harmony of interests" between the United States and the countries
of the European Union. Rather, Kagan communicates that American power was
exercised in a manner that permitted the Europeans to produce a liberal, transnational
community singularly spectacular in the history of world politics.
Reconciling the power and paradise paradigms in global public health will
require the great powers to exercise their material capabilities in ways that help
empower the governments and peoples of the developing world to produce
achievable improvements in health conditions. The axis of illness teaches that no
one strategy will deliver such a reconciliation but that health outcomes deserve to
be an important item on many different political and diplomatic agenda-from
national security to international trade to human rights. Those concerned about the
future of global public health can perhaps take some comfort in the resilience
health as an issue demonstrates across these disparate policy areas. Something with
potential is afoot when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,2" 9 the World Trade
Organization, 22 and human rights advocates 2 ' all promote the importance of public
health in the "high politics" of international relations. This reality does not
represent policy convergence between the power and paradise paradigms because
the two remain far apart in terms of their premises and objectives. What we have is
concurrency-both paradigms engaged on their own terms with the growing
importance of global public health.
The concurrency that entities as distinct as the Central Intelligence Agency,
World Trade Organization, and human rights advocates display on the new
political importance for public health does not mean that harmony prevails, or will
prevail, in the aftermath of public health's political revolution. Kagan reminds
Americans and Europeans that, despite not sharing a common view of the world,
they share common beliefs and aspirations for the world. Solidarity on the political
importance of health in international relations is not as developed as the political
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belief-system shared by Americans and Europeans, and such deep consensus may
never materialize in the context of public health. The concurrency that has occurred
provides, however, an opportunity to produce some common understanding on
health that may, one day, lead to significant progress in rich and poor countries. To
borrow again from Kagan, let me conclude by saying that "[p]erhaps it is not too
nafvely optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a
long way.
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